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Abstract 
 
One of the hallmarks of our patent system is that it provides a one-size-fits-all reward for innovation. Few deny a uniform 
20-year patent term for all inventions provides too much protection for some, and too little for others.  But absent a principled 
and  administrable  alternative,  the  uniform  patent  system  has  been  our  best  option.   We  may  know  which  economic 
determinants  are  relevant  to  a  socially  optimal  patent  term  and  which  predispose  a  patent  to  stifling  future 
innovation.  However, we have lacked a reliable way to measure and synthesize that information in a framework that the 
government could actually use to tailor patent awards. This paper identifies a readily observable, cross-industry indication of 
the socially optimal amount of patent protection that different technologies deserve.  It demonstrates that “time-to-market,” or 
the time taken for an invention to reach the market, provides the foundation for a system of tailoring patents that strikes the 
correct equilibrium, balancing the benefits of innovation against the social costs of patents, both in the form of monopoly pricing 
and threats to subsequent innovation. 
 
Table of Contents 
 
I.   Introduction                      2 
II.  Minimum Sufficient Patent Awards and the Costs of Uniformity          11 
III. Sequential Innovation and the Rising Costs of Uniformity            19 
IV. The Missing Framework for Implementing a Tailored Patent System        26 
V.  Providing a Framework: the Argument for Tailoring Based on Time-to-Market       32 
A.  Industry Differences in the Average Time-to-Market for New Inventions      33 
B.  Time-to-Market Strongly Correlates with the Primary Predictors of Optimal Patent Length  40 
1.  Time-To-Market as a Signal of R&D Costs, Uncertainty, and Future  
Revenue Streams                41 
2.  The Option of Adding Imitation Costs into the Equation        46 
3.  Policy Implications                48 
C.  Time-to-Market Strongly Correlates with the Predictors of Optimal Patent Length in  
Models of Sequential Innovation              53  
1.  The Correlation between Product Life Cycle Length and Optimal Patent Length  54 
2.  Tailoring based on Time-to-Market as a Proxy for Product Life Cycles    60 
D.  Time-to-Market is Sufficiently Observable to Support a System of Tailored Patent Awards  66 
VI. Other Objections to Tailoring Patent Awards              70 
A.  The TRIPS Objection                71 
B.  The Political Economy Objection              74 
VII. Conclusion                      80 
   
                                                              
∗ Hieken Assistant Professor of Patent Law, Harvard Law School.   
  2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the defining characteristics of the current patent system is that it applies a uniform 
set of rules to all inventions, and does not discriminate on the basis of technology or industry. 
This  uniformity  is  also  one  of  the  most  problematic  aspects  of  the  patent  system.  There  is 
overwhelming evidence that the costs and benefits of the system greatly vary across industries.1 
Patents are critical for innovation in some industries, and they appear to be stifling it in others. 
The  government  knowingly  overlooks  these  differences  when  it  awards  patent  rights  on 
inventions. The justification for this oversight is not that the uniform patent laws are optimal, but 
rather that we lack an administrable system for tailoring patent awards in a manner that would 
benefit the public. This paper identifies the basis for such a system.  Certain types of inventions 
take  much  longer  to  develop  than  others,  and  that  difference  in  time-to-market  strongly 
correlates with both the need for patent protection in an industry and the risk that patents will 
stifle subsequent innovation. The government can use this observable feature of inventions as the 
foundation for an objective and remarkably accurate system of tailored patent awards.  
The patent system protects a wide array of technologies – everything from microbial fuel 
cells  and  radiolabeled  pharmaceuticals  to  interactive  cat  toys  and  utensil  holders  for 
dishwashers.2 Patents are essential for motivating investment in R&D in some circumstances.3 
                                                              
1 See Asish Arora et al., R&D and the Patent Premium, 26 INT’L J. INDUSTRIAL ORG. 1153, 1170 (2008); Knut Blind et 
al., Motives to Patent: Empirical Evidence from Germany, 35 RES. POL. 655, 661 (2006); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting 
Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NBER Working Paper 
7552  (2000);  FEDERAL  TRADE  COMMISSION  (FTC),  TO  PROMOTE  INNOVATION:  THE  PROPER  BALANCE  OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 (2003); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High-Technology Entrepreneurs 
and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009); Richard C. Levin et 
al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
783 (1987); Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907 (1981); STEPHEN 
MERRILL ET AL., EDS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 35 (2004).   
2 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that “anything under the sun that is made by man” is 
eligible for patent protection).  
3 See  FTC,  supra  note  1,  ch.  3  (discussing  the  importance  of  patent  protection  in  the  pharmaceutical  and 
biotechnology industries for motivating R&D investments, while noting that patents appear to have mixed effects on  
  3 
However, they also inevitably limit the public’s access to new inventions on the market through 
monopoly pricing. In an ideal patent system, firms would be given the least amount of patent 
protection necessary to call forth their inventions. It is obvious that some inventions require far 
more  protection  than  others,  but  the  patent  laws  largely  ignore  these  differences. 4 The 
government applies a uniform set of rules to determine whether inventions are patentable,5 and it 
awards all inventions a 20-year term of protection.6 This one-size-fits-all approach to promoting 
innovation  provides  excessive  monopoly  protection  for  many  new  inventions,  while  offering 
insufficient incentives for the development of others.  
Scholars and policymakers have long recognized that uniform patent laws cannot provide 
the optimal incentives for innovation,7 but it is now clear that the social costs of this one-size-fits-
all system are much greater than was once imagined. Innovation is a cumulative and additive 
phenomenon.8 Researchers  are  constantly  building  upon  one  another’s  inventions  to  create 
newer and better ones, and each step forward in technology generates knowledge spillovers that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
R&D  in  computer  hardware  and  semiconductors,  and  perhaps  negative  effects  on  innovation  in  the  software 
industry); Levin et al., supra note 1; Mansfield et al., supra note 1. 
4 See Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FED. LAWYER 44 (2008).  
5 With very few exceptions, the patent system relies on facially neutral standards to determine whether inventions are 
patentable. See Long, supra note 4. There is enough ambiguity in these standards for courts to apply slightly different 
legal tests to different types of inventions. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1575 (2003). However, judicial tailoring of this sort is tightly circumscribed by the technology-neutral statutes 
that govern patent law.  
6 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). Technically speaking, the patent term is 20 years minus the time it takes for the PTO to 
grant the patent, since the “patent term” does not really begin until the patent issues and can be enforced. See Paul 
M. Janicke, A Need for Clearer Language about Patent Law, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 457, 465-67 (2012). 
Moreover, the patent term is not entirely uniform, since firms can receive patent-term extensions when they lost 
patent life due to certain types of regulatory delays. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (authorizing the PTO to grant patent-term 
extensions for applications that are held up during prosecution due to PTO delays or that take longer than 3 years to 
issue – subject to a number of limitations); 35 U.S.C. § 156 (authorizing the PTO to grant patent-term extensions on 
inventions subject to premarket regulatory review that delays their commercialization).   
7 See Walton Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise, U.S. Senate, 76th Cong. 3d Sess., Temporary National Economic 
Committee, Monograph No. 31, at 157 (1941); C. Michael White, Why A Seventeen Year Patent?, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
839, 842-45 (1956).  
8 See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 29 (1991).   
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facilitate further technological advances.9 In an environment where innovation begets innovation, 
the patent system not only restricts public access to inventions through monopoly pricing, it may 
actually impede future technological progress by making it harder for other firms to build upon 
earlier discoveries.10 Conversely, when the patent system fails to call forth a new invention by 
offering  too  little  protection,  the  public  loses  not  just  that  one  invention,  but  also  all  future 
advances  that  would  have  come  from  it.  Providing  enough  patent  protection  to  motive 
innovation is critical, therefore, but providing too much protection will tend to stifle innovation.  
The drawbacks of relying on a uniform patent system became painfully apparent during 
the legislative debates leading up to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 201111 – the first 
major U.S. patent reform legislation in almost 60 years. The impetus for this bill came from the 
high-tech industries (i.e., software, semiconductors, and other computer hardware), where the 
relationship between patents and innovation appears to be “deeply dysfunctional.”12 High-tech 
firms usually report that they would develop most of their inventions without patents, and that 
                                                              
9 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF 
CAPITALISM 11-12 (2002); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 268-269 
(2007); ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 42-46 (2004); Joel Mokyr, The Contribution of 
Economic History to the Study of Innovation and Technical Change: 1750-1914, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
INNOVATION 14 (Brownyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg, eds. 2010). 
10 See  SUZANNE  SCOTCHMER,  INNOVATION  AND  INCENTIVES  127-157  (2004)  (reviewing  the  literature  on 
cumulative innovation).  
11 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
12 L. Gordon Crovitz, Google, Motorola and the Patent Wars, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2011; see also James E. Bessen, A 
Generation of Software Patents, Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-31 (2011); 
Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 325, 350-90 (2013); Eric Goldman, Fixing Software 
Patents,  Santa  Clara  Law  Digital  Commons  (1/1/2013);  Iain  M.  Cockburn  &  Megan  J.  MacGarvie,  Entry and 
Patenting in the Software Industry,  57  MGMT. SCI.  915  (2011);  Eloise  Gratton, Should Patent Protection Be Considered for 
Software-Related Innovations?, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 223, 250 (2003); Brian Kahan, Agenda for Reform: Patent Reform 
for a Digital Economy, Computer and Communications Industry Association (2006); Peter S. Menell, The Challenge of 
Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2645-46 (1994); Mark Aaron 
Paley, Article: A Model Software Petite Patent Act, 12 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 301, 306 (1996); Mark H. Webbink, 
A New Paradigm for Intellectual Property Rights in Software, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, 28 (2005); David A. Wheeler, 
Eliminate  Software  Patents  (2011),  at  http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/software-patents.html  (containing  links  to 
numerous articles that are critical of software patents written by academics, venture capitalists, entrepreneurs and 
industry executives).  
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the government is granting unnecessary and excessive patent monopolies that stifle innovation.13 
These firms lobbied Congress for numerous reforms that would help mitigate these problems by 
making  it  easier  to  invalidate  and  harder  to  enforce  patents. 14 Not  every  industry  was 
experiencing  these  same  issues  with  the  patent  system,  however.  In  the  pharmaceutical  and 
biotechnology industries (and perhaps a few other sectors), patents are widely viewed as critical 
for motivating private sector R&D,15 and there are fewer complaints about patents inhibiting 
follow-on innovation.16 Many scholars believe that substantially weakening patent protection for 
drugs  and  biotechnology  would  have  disastrous  consequences  for  public  health. 17  Not 
surprisingly, the firms in these industries fought tooth and nail to block most of the reforms 
advocated by high-tech firms.18 After seven years of intense lobbying, very few of the high-tech 
                                                              
13 See FTC, supra note 1, at ch. 3, 30-56.  
14 See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 1341 (2009); 
Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435 (2012).  
15 Patents are probably most effective at spurring innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, although they appear to 
have important effects in several others, including biotechnology, agrochemicals, medical devices, clean energy, and 
certain types of genetically modified crops. See Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. Macintosh, The Determinants of R&D 
Expenditures: A Study of the Canadian Biotechnology Industry, 17 REV. INDUSTRIAL ORG. 357, 364, 366-68 (2000); Bronwyn 
H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Recent Research on the Economics of Patents, NBER Working Paper 17773, 15 (Jan. 2011), at 
http://www.nber.org/tmp/84437-w17773.pdf;  Gaynor  Hartnell,  Innovation  of  Agrochemicals:  Regulation  and  Patent 
Protection, 25 RES. POL. 379, 387 (1996); Lynn K. Mytelka & Grant Boyle, Making Choices About Hydrogen: Transport 
Issues for Developing Countries,  International  Development  Research  Centre,  United  Nations  38  (2008);  David  E. 
Schimmelpfennig et al., The Impact of Seed Industry Concentration on Innovation: A Study of US Biotech Market Leaders, 30 
AGRICULTURAL ECON. 157 (2004) (finding that patents significantly increase R&D spending related to genetically 
modified soybeans, although it is possible that patents are inhibiting R&D spending on other crops (like corn and 
cotton) where there are other barriers to imitation that make patents less important).   
16 See Hall & Harhoff, supra note 15, at 15; MERRILL ET AL., supra note 1; FTC, supra note 1, at ch. 3. There are 
plenty of concerns about biotechnology patents stifling downstream innovation. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Clarisa Long, Patents 
and Cumulative Innovation,  2  WASH.  U.J.L.  &  POL’Y  229,  246  (2000);  Arti  Kaur  Rai,  Regulating Scientific Research: 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 77, 120-135 (1999). Relative to the high-tech 
industries, however, it is easier for biotechnology companies to navigate the IP landscape in their fields, and the 
innovation-stifling effects of these patents are probably less significant. See MERRILL ET AL., supra note 1; FTC, supra 
note 1, at ch. 3.  
17 See infra notes and text accompanying notes 209-219.  
18 See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 14.   
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industries’ desired reforms made it into the final legislation,19 and the ongoing “patent crisis” 
there continues unabated.  
The legislative backstory to the America Invents Act is only the most recent example of 
where the commitment to uniformity blocked patent reforms that are desperately needed in one 
industry because they would be detrimental to the interests of another.20 An obvious solution to 
this dilemma would be for Congress or the courts to implement the desired patent reforms only 
in the industries that need them. This approach would allow the government to curtail excessive 
patent grants in one field without diminishing patent protection in the areas where it is important 
for innovation.  
There is a long history of resistance to differentiated patent awards in the U.S,21 but a 
growing number of legal scholars and economists are now calling for a more tailored approach to 
awarding patents.22 The uniform 20-year patent term is perhaps the most obvious candidate for 
                                                              
19 See  Zach  Carter,  The Spoilsmen: How Congress Corrupted Patent Reform  (2011)  at  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/08/04/patent-reform-congress_n_906278.html?view=print; Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as 
a Sword,  N.Y.  Times,  Oct.  7,  2012  (noting  that  “lobbyists  from  high-tech  corporations  and  the  pharmaceutical 
industry … push[ed] conflicting proposals,” which “paralyzed Congress’s ability to make real changes, lawmakers 
and lobbyists say,” and that the America Invents Act ultimately “achieved mostly administrative fixes”).  
20 See Chien, supra note 12, at 347-348 (discussing the railroad patent crisis and agrarian design patent crisis of the 
late 1800s); Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J.  1583,  1594-96  (2009)  (noting  the  automobile  industry’s  trouble  with  patents  in  the  early  twentieth 
century).  
21 MERRILL ET AL., supra note 1, at 84.  
22 See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of Intellectual Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 
1406-07  (2011);  Michael  J.  Burstein,  Rules for Patents,  52  WM. & MARY L. REV.  1747  (2011);  JAMES BESSEN & 
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 
(2008); DAN BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); Daniel 
R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 587 (2006); Michael W. 
Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006); William 
Fisher, The Disaggregation of Intellectual Property: How the Laws of Intellectual Property Have Grown—and Grown Apart, HARV. 
L. BULL., Summer 2004, at 24, 29–31; Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 269 (2006); Amir H. Khoury, Differential Patent Terms and the Commercial Capacity of Innovation, 18 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 373 (2010); Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 321-26 (2010); Peter 
S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 487, 493-95 (2007); Peter S. 
Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, J. LEG. ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2013); Craig Allen 
Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1619 (2007); Frank Partnoy, 
Finance and Patent Length  12-17  (2001)  12-17,  U.  San  Diego  Law  &  Econ.  Research  Paper  No.  19,  available at 
http//ssrn.com/abstract=285144; Richard A. Posner, Why There are Too Many Patents in America, THE ATLANTIC, July  
  7 
reform.23 It is difficult to imagine that a 20-year monopoly provides the optimal incentives for the 
development of both artificial-heart technology and the slide-to-unlock software for smartphones. 
Indeed,  a  number  of  commentators  advocate  shortening  the  patent  term  for  software  as  a 
solution to the current patent crisis in that industry.24 Nevertheless, a large contingent of patent 
scholars remain staunchly opposed to any departure from uniform the patent laws, including 
selective changes to the patent term.25  
The  primary  objection  to  tailoring  patent  awards  is  that  we  lack  a  principled  and 
administrable framework for the government to use when determining which inventions should 
receive  more  protection  than  others.26 The  economic  theory  of  optimal  patent  length  is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
12, 2012; Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 301 (2011); F.M. Scherer, 
Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972); STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 154 (2004); White, supra note 7, at 842-45. Other scholars have 
argued  for  tailoring  through  policies  outside  of  the  patent  system,  particular  in  the  pharmaceutical  and 
biotechnology industries. See Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially Neutral Patent Standards with 
Therapeutic Regulation,  45  HOUS.  L.  REV.  1037  (2008);  Benjamin  N.  Roin,  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of 
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503 (2009).  
23 Several scholars have proposed tailoring the patent term. See Abramowicz, supra note 22; Cahoy, supra note 22; 
Hamilton, supra note 7; Johnson, supra note 22; Khoury, supra note 22; Menell, supra note 22; Partnoy, supra note 22; 
Posner, supra note 22; Scherer, supra note 22; SHAVELL, supra note 22; White, supra note 7.  
24 See  Defend  Innovation,  Electronic  Frontier  Foundation,  at  https://defendinnovation.org/proposal/shorten-
patent-term; James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000 (Magazine), at 44; Paley, supra note 12, at 306; 
Webbink, supra note 12, at 28. A few prescient scholars advocated a shorter patent term for software before the crisis. 
Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1365 (1987); Menell, supra note 
12; Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 
2408 (1994). There is also some support for this idea within industry. See Jeff Bezos, Bezos and O’Reilly Spearhead Call for 
Patent  Reform:  An  Open  Letter  from  Jeff  Bezos  on  the  Subject  of  Patents,  Mar.  9,  2000,  at 
http://oreilly.com/news/amazon_patents.html  (“[B]usiness  method  and  software  patents  should  have  a  much 
shorter lifespan than the current 17 years – I would propose 3 to 5 years.”).   
25 See Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 
STAN. L. REV.  455  (2010);  ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER,  INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 203-05 
(2004); Long, supra note 4, at 47-49; William D. Nordhaus, The Optimal Life of a Patent: Reply, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 428, 
430 (1972); JAE HUN PARK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRY STANDARDS 162-63 (2010); Qin Shi, Patent System Meets New 
Sciences: Is the Law Responsive to Changing Technologies and Industries?, 61 N.Y.U. ANNUAL SURVEY OF AM. L. 317 (2005); 
R.  Polk  Wagner,  (Mostly)  Against  Exceptionalism,  in  PERSPECTIVES  ON  PROPERTIES  OF  THE  HUMAN  GENOME 
PROJECT 367 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003); cf. F. Scott Kieff & Henry E. Smith, How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis, in 
REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE: POLICY CHANGES WE CAN AFFORD 63 (Terry L. Anderson & Richard Sousa 
eds.  2009)  (objecting  to  tailoring  proposals  policies  that  would  arguably  lead  to  more  uncertainty  over  the 
availability, scope and enforceability of patent protection).  
26 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at 203-04; Long, supra note 4, at 49; PARK, supra note 25, 162-63.    
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complicated,27 and  applying  that  theory  to  a  particular  field  of  technology  is  notoriously 
difficult.28 Proponents of tailoring have identified a long list of economic factors the government 
would  need  to  consider  when  determining  the  appropriate  duration  and  strength  of  patent 
protection in an industry. Many of these factors are hard to assess, and the sheer number of them 
would make the inquiry unpredictable, unwieldy, and vulnerable to manipulation. Even if the 
government  were  all  but  certain  that  the  patent  system  is  providing  too  much  or  too  little 
protection in an industry, past attempts to correct this type of problem through technology-
specific rules have proven disappointingly ineffective.29 The dividing lines between technologies 
are highly permeable and tend to shift rapidly as technology changes. Firms can often draft their 
patent claims to select into categories offering greater protection, and technology-specific rules 
frequently become obsolete shortly after becoming law. Unless the government can better link 
these  rules  to  less  manipulatable  economic  characteristics  of  inventions,  technology-specific 
patent laws may be an exercise in futility.  
This paper provides a foundation for an administrable system of tailoring patent awards 
that would avoid these problems. The government can use the amount of time it takes to develop 
inventions to determine which industries and technological fields should receive more or less 
                                                              
27 See, e.g., Ian Ayers & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse 
Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999); John F. Duffy, A Minimum Optimal Patent 
Term  (2003),  available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=354282;  Nancy  T.  Gallini,  Patent Policy and Costly Imitation,  23 
RAND J. ECON. 52 (1992); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 
106, 111 (1990); Morton I. Kamien & Nancy L. Schwartz, Patent Life and R & D Rivalry, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 183 
(1974);  Louis  Kaplow,  The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal,  97  HARV. L. REV.  1813  (1984);  WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,  THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE  OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW  (2003);  W. 
NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE 76-88 (1969); Ted O’Donoghue et al., Patent Breadth, Patent Life, 
and the Pace of Technological Progress, 7 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1 (1998); Scherer, supra note 22. 
28 See David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PENN. 
L. REV. 1613, 1615 (2009); Ian Ayers & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 892 
(2007) (“Quantitatively tailoring the patent system is a Herculean burden.”). 
29 Many of the scholars who advocate tailoring patent awards on the basis of technology are opposed to legal rules 
that explicitly discriminate along technological lines, and argue instead that courts (or an agency) should use facially 
neutral legal standards to tailor their patent awards to the needs for patent protection in each industry. See BURK & 
LEMLEY, supra note 22; MERRILL ET AL., supra note 1, at 83-85; Rai, supra note 22.    
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protection relative to others. The crux of the article is the claim that time-to-market is strongly 
correlated with the optimal patent life of inventions.  
First, the paper shows that the time-to-market for inventions bears a close relationship to 
the amount of patent protection needed to motivate their development. The ideal patent award 
for an invention is primarily a function of its R&D costs, the risk of failure in that R&D, the 
anticipated future revenue streams from the project if it succeeds, and the potential for imitation 
by  rivals.  The  time-to-market  for  inventions  is  a  reliable  indicia  of  all  four  factors.  Longer 
development cycles increase the costs of capital for an R&D investment while diminishing the 
value of future revenue streams because of discounting. They are also correlated with higher out-
of-pocket  R&D  costs,  greater  technological  uncertainty,  and  in  most  cases,  an  increased 
vulnerability to free riding from competitive imitation. Inventions that take longer to reach the 
market therefore are much more likely to need a lengthy patent term as an incentive for their 
R&D, whereas inventions with a shorter time-to-market usually need much less protection.  
Second, the paper demonstrates that time-to-market is a strong predictor of the extent to 
which  patents  are  likely  to  stifle  follow-on  innovation.  Although  patents  are  supposed  to 
encourage  investment  in  R&D,  strengthening  patent  rights  can  have  the  opposite  effect  in 
industries where earlier innovators would develop their inventions irrespective of those stronger 
patent rights; where the patents on those earlier inventions often cover many later improvements 
in the technology; and where transaction costs in licensing are high. The time-to-market for 
inventions is inversely related to all three. Inventions that reach the market quickly tend to have a 
short product life cycle, since it takes less time for firms to develop the newer inventions that 
ultimately replace them on the market. Under conditions of rapid incremental innovation and 
fast product turnover, patents tend to be much less important than first-mover advantages for 
motivating investments in R&D. Those patents are also more likely to read onto several future  
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generations  of  incremental  improvements  in  the  technology,  which  imposes  a  tax  on  later 
innovators.  Moreover,  the  transaction  costs  in  licensing  are  higher  for  inventions  with  short 
product  life  cycles  because  negotiation  delays  erode  a  larger  portion  of  their  already  brief 
commercial lifespan. The time-to-market for inventions therefore provides a powerful indicator 
not only to inventions’ need for patent protection, but also to whether those patents are likely to 
impede subsequent innovation.  
Since the optimal patent award for inventions in a field strongly correlates with their 
average  time-to-market,  which  is  readily  observable,  this  paper  argues  that  the  government 
should tailor its patent awards on this basis. It presents evidence from a wide range of sources 
showing that the average time-to-market for inventions varies greatly across industries. In finance, 
consumer  products,  software  and  semiconductors,  development  cycles  are  quick  and  new 
inventions  usually  reach  the  market  quickly.  Industries  on  the  opposite  end  of  the  spectrum 
include  pharmaceuticals,  biotechnology,  clean  energy,  and  oil  and  gas  drilling,  where 
development  times  can  run  from  five  to  20  years.  Tailoring  patent  awards  to  reflect  these 
differences could avoid many of the problems that now plague the patent system. Although the 
paper  primarily  focuses  on  tailoring  patent  protection  through  variable  patent  terms,  the 
government  could  use  a  variety  of  other  policy  levers  as  well,  including  the  standards  of 
patentability, the scope of patent protection, the stringency of PTO examinations, antitrust rules, 
government subsidies, or even prizes.  
Parts II and III of the paper outline the theoretical case for why tailored patent awards 
are preferable to a one-size-fits-all system, and set forth the main economic factors relevant to 
optimal  patent  length.  Part  IV  describes  the  primary  objection  that  has  been  raised  against 
tailoring patent awards. Part V is the heart of the article. It reports figures on the average time-
to-market for inventions in a wide range of industries; it shows that time-to-market is strongly  
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correlated with optimal patent length; argues that the government should use time-to-market to 
tailor its patent awards; and provides several examples of where tailoring the patent term based 
on time-to-market could generate immense benefits for the public. Part VI then discusses and 
rebuts two other objections to tailoring through technology-specific patent laws – that those laws 
would violate the TRIPS agreement, and that powerful industry groups would distort the laws to 
such a degree that they would ultimately harm the public. Part VII concludes.  
 
 
II.  Minimum Sufficient Patent Awards and the Cost of Uniformity 
The  patent  system  is  designed  to  promote  innovation  by  awarding  firms  temporary 
monopoly rights over their inventions. Those awards are costly to the extent that they restrict 
access to new inventions. In an ideal patent system, firms would receive just enough patent 
protection to motivate the R&D of their inventions, but no more. It is clear that some inventions 
need  more  protection  than  others  to  reach  the  public,  and  that  the  importance  of  patent 
protection varies by industry. Although scholars and policymakers are aware of these differences, 
the patent system continues to operate as a one-size-fits-all system of promoting innovation. The 
uniform patent laws are simultaneously over- and under-inclusive, providing unnecessary and 
excessive  protection  against  competition  in  many  cases  and  inadequate  protection  in  others. 
Within this system of largely indiscriminate patent awards, almost any policy that adjusts the 
overall strength or availability of patent protection will correct for one of these problems at the 
expense of the other one. A more tailored system of patent awards is one of the only ways to 
avoid this costly tradeoff.  
Although patents perform a number of different economic functions, the system’s primary 
goal has always been “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” as is proscribed in  
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the  U.S.  Constitution.30 The  system  operates  to  correct  a  particular  market  failure  in  the 
incentives for investing in R&D that can arise when it is easier to imitate an invention than to 
create it.31 Not all investments in R&D are vulnerable to this type of free riding,32 but many of 
them  are. 33 Indeed,  firms  routinely  capitalize  on  their  rivals’  R&D  through  competitive 
imitation.34 This strategy allows firms to save money on R&D and marketing,35 and to minimize 
their risk exposure by copying only those inventions that are a technological and commercial 
success.36 The patent system addresses this free-rider deterrent to R&D investment by giving 
                                                              
30 Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. The classic economic view also characterizes patents as a tool for promoting innovation. See 
FRITZ MACHLUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 21 (Comm. Print 1958).  
31 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF 
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (Richard Nelson ed. 1962).   
32 See  MICHELE  BOLDRIN  &  DAVID  K.  LEVINE,  AGAINST  INTELLECTUAL  MONOPOLY  123-146  &  184  (2008) 
(acknowledging that competitive markets can result in a failure that undermines the incentives for innovation, but 
arguing that this problem is much smaller than economists commonly assume). 
33 A study by Mansfield et al. of 48 product innovations found that the cost of imitating those innovations, on 
average, was roughly two-thirds the cost of creating them.  See Mansfield et al., supra note 3, at 910. There is 
tremendous variation in the data, however, since half of the product innovations had imitation costs that were either 
less than 40 percent or more than 90 percent of the original R&D costs, suggesting that many inventions are either 
very difficult or fairly easy to imitate. Id. A survey of industrial R&D executives by Levin et al. also found that 
imitation is usually less expensive than innovation, but again with significant variation across inventions. See Levin et 
al.,  supra  note  3,  at  807-812.  A  survey  of  industrial  R&D  executives  at  Swiss  firms  concluded  that  imitating 
unpatented inventions costs 40 to 50 percent less than creating them on average. See Najib Harabi, Innovation Versus 
Imitation:  Empirical  Evidence  from  Swiss  Firms,  MPRA  Paper  No.  26214  (1991),  at  http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/26214/.  
34 See Michele Kremen Bolton, Imitation Versus Innovation: Lessons to be Learned from the Japanese, 21 ORGANIZATIONAL 
DYNAMICS 32 (1993); STEVEN P. SCHNAARS, MANAGING IMITATION STRATEGIES: HOW LATER ENTRANTS SEIZE 
MARKETS FROM PIONEERS 1 (1994) (“Imitation is not only more abundant than innovation, it is actually a much 
more prevalent road to business growth and profits.”). A survey of 416 firms in 2004 found that 30% reported 
pursuing  a  first-to-market  strategy,  while  over  35%  claimed  to  pursue  a  “fast  follower”  strategy.  See  Marjorie 
Adams, PDMA Foundation New Product Development Report Initial Findings: Summary of Responses from 2004 CPAS, PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT & MGMT. ASSOCIATION 27 (2004).  
35 See  Gezinus J. Hidding et al., The IT Platform Principle: The First Shall Not Be First, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2010; 
SCHNAARS, supra note 34, at 31.  
36 See Bolton, supra note 34, at 30; SCHNAARS, supra note 34, at 23. Industry surveys indicate that anywhere from 25 
to 76% of R&D projects fail to produce a marketable invention. See Adams, supra note 34; Abbie Griffin, PDMA 
Research on New Product Development Practices: Updating Trends and Benchmarking Best Practices, 14 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION 
MGMT. 429, 447-48 (1997); Henrique Rocha & Mauricio Delamaro, Project/Product Development Process Critical Success 
Factors: A Literature Compilation, 2 RES. IN LOGISTICS & PRODUCTION 274, 275 (2012). Among those R&D projects 
that succeed on a technological level, anywhere from 40 to 95% of the resulting inventions are commercial failures. 
See Adams, supra note 34; Carmen Nobel, Clay Christensen’s Milkshake Marketing, HBS WORKING KNOWLEDGE 1, Feb.  
  13 
innovators the exclusive right to make, use and sell their inventions for a limited period of time, 
allowing them to earn monopoly profits on their inventions.37  
This protection offered by patents is important for motivating at least some of private 
industry’s R&D investments.38 However, many inventions would reach the public even without 
these  legal  barriers  to  imitation. 39 It  usually  takes  time  for  other  firms  to  develop  and 
commercialize  their  own  version  of  a  rival’s  invention,40 which  gives  the  innovator  time  to 
recover  some  or  all  of  its  R&D  costs.  This  lead-time  sometimes  translates  into  more  lasting 
competitive advantages as well,41 especially when the lead-time is substantial,42 their head start 
allows them to stay ahead of rivals by continually improving upon their invention, or there are 
“switching costs” that deter existing customers from buying the imitations.43  
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
14,  2011;  ORACLE,  ACCELERATE  PRODUCT  INNOVATION  AND  MAXIMIZE  PROFITABILITY  10  (2011) 
at http://www.oracle.com/us/products/applications/agile/agile-product-lifecycle-mgmt-070032.pdf.  
37 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2011).  
38 See Arora et al., supra note 1, at 1170; Mansfield et al., supra note 1. Even the harshest critics of the patent system 
acknowledge  (even  if  only  by  implication)  that  the  patent  system  motivates  at  least  some  private  sector  R&D, 
although they believe that the number of R&D projects that would not occur but for the patent system is smaller 
than the number of projects that do not occur because of the patent system. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. 
Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 7 (2013).  
39 Surveys of industry executives reveal that, in most industries, firms would have developed the vast majority of their 
patented inventions even without that protection. See Levin et al., supra note 1, at 808-12; Mansfield et al., supra note 
1, at 907-10; Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT SCI. 173 (1986).   
40 See Harabi, supra note 33; Levin et al., supra note 1, at 807-12; Mansfield et al., supra note 1, at 910.  
41 See William T. Robinson & Sungwook Min, Is the First To Market the First To Fail? Empirical Evidence for Industrial Goods 
Businesses, 39 J. MARKETING RES. 120 (2002). The literature on first-mover advantages suggests that they are heavily 
contingent upon other factors, including whether the invention is an “appropriable technology,” which may depend 
on  whether  there  is  strong  patent  protection  or  trade  secrecy  available.  See  Marvin  B.  Lieberman,  First Mover 
Advantages, in PALGRAVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, (forthcoming).  
42 See Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover (Dis)Advantages: Retrospective and Link with the Resource-
Based View, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1111, 1117-20, 1121 (1998); Luis E. López & Edward B. Roberts, First-Mover 
Advantages in Regimes of Weak Appropriability: the Case of Financial Services Innovations,  55  J. BUS. RES.  97, 1004 (2002) 
(finding that “if subsequent entrants invade the market within short periods of time after the pioneer, pioneering 
advantages are scant”); Robinson & Min, supra note 41, at 127.  
43 See Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 42-43 & 46-
47 (1988).   
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To the extent that the patent system is effective at promoting innovation by shielding 
firms  from  competitive  imitation,  it  serves  a  critical  function  in  enhancing  social  welfare.44 
Inventions are information-based goods that are “nonrivalrous,” in that the idea for an invention 
can be used over and over again by any number of people without diminishing in value, and 
without anyone needing to repeat the initial investment in R&D that created it.45 These features 
allow for increasing returns to scale on the use of the world’s finite supply of labor and capital.46 
Innovation is therefore the primary driver of long-run economic growth, and thus is responsible 
for much of the wealth of the modern world.47 Most of the funding for R&D that produces this 
innovation comes from private industry.48 Empirical studies have consistently found that private 
sector R&D generates tremendous social value on average,49 and that the social rate of return 
                                                              
44 Among other benefits, technological progress has allowed people to live increasingly longer and more comfortable 
lives. See DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR AMERICA’S HEALTHCARE 
SYSTEM 1-9 (2004); Richard A. Easterlin, The Worldwide Standard of Living Since 1800, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 7, 
12 (2000); JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES: TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 303 
(1990).  
45 See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S74-S75 (1990). 
46 As Paul Romer explains: 
In a world with physical limits, it is discoveries of big ideas (for example, how to make high-temperature 
superconductors), together with the discoveries of millions of little ideas (better ways to sew a shirt), that make 
persistent economic growth possible. Ideas are the instructions that let us combine limited physical resources 
in arrangements that are ever more valuable. 
Paul  M.  Romer,  Two Strategies for Economic Development: Using Ideas and Producing Ideas,  in  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE 
WORLD BANK: ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1992 64 (Lawrence H. Summers & Shkhar 
Shah, eds. 1993); see also Charles I. Jones, Growth and Ideas, in 1B HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 1063, 1088-
89 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds. 2005).  
47 The empirical evidence linking economic growth to innovation dates back to Robert Solow’s groundbreaking 
work in the 1950s. See Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. ECON. 65 (1956); 
Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. STATISTICS 312 (1957). The 
claim that innovation drives long-run economic growth is now well established. See PHILIPPE AGHION & PETER 
HOWITT,  ENDOGENOUS GROWTH THEORY  11  (1997);  W.  BRIAN ARTHUR,  THE NATURE  OF TECHNOLOGY: 
WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT EVOLVES 10 (2009); BAUMOL, supra note 9, at 13; N. Gregory Mankiw, The Growth of 
Nations, 1995 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY  275, 280 (1995); RICHARD R. NELSON, THE SOURCES OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 31 (1996).  
48 See National Science Foundation (NSF), Division of Science Resources Statistics, National Patterns of R&D Resources: 
2008 Data Update, 22-23 tbl. 5 (2010).  
49 See  Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO),  R&D  and  Productivity  Growth:  A  Background  Paper,  23-28  (2005);  ZVI 
GRILICHES,  R&D,  EDUCATION,  AND  PRODUCTIVITY:  A  RETROSPECTIVE  70  (2000);  Bronwyn  H.  Hall  et  al.,  
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from  privately  funded  R&D  is  usually  far  greater  than  the  profits  firms  earn  from  their 
investments.50  
The patent system also imposes costs on society, however, because it reduces the social 
value  of  inventions  by  restricting  access  to  them.  Patents  entice  firms  to  invest  in  R&D  by 
allowing them to sell their inventions at supra-competitive prices.  By their very nature, therefore, 
patents make it harder for consumers to afford new inventions. This pricing distortion results in 
deadweight loss, as those consumers who would buy patented inventions at their competitive (but 
not supra-competitive) prices are pushed out of the market.51 The higher prices can also inhibit 
subsequent advances in patented technologies by limiting the ability of researchers to use and 
improve upon other firms’ inventions.52 Offering too much patent protection might even reduce 
a firm’s incentive to continue investing in R&D, allowing it to rely on its monopoly rights for a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Measuring the Returns to R&D, in 2 HANDBOOKS IN ECONOMICS: ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 1065-1073 (Bronwyn 
H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010) (surveying the economic literature). 
50 See CBO, supra note 49, at 9; Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCAND. J. ECON. S29, S43 (1992); Brett 
M. Fischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.  257, 259-260 n.5 (2007); John M. Golden, 
Innovation Dynamics, Patents, and Dynamic-Elasticity Tests for the Promotion of Progress, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 47, 61-63 
(2010); Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Measuring the Returns to R&D, in 2 HANDBOOKS IN ECONOMICS: ECONOMICS OF 
INNOVATION 1073 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010); HELPMAN, supra note 9, at 43; Charles I. 
Jones & John C. Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R&D, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1119, 1134 (1998); R. Polk Wagner, 
Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003).  
51 See Arrow, supra note 31, at 616-17.  
52 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 16; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997); Long, supra note 16; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Rai, supra note 16, at 120-135; SCOTCHMER, supra note 10, at 127-157.    
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competitive advantage instead of spending more on R&D to stay ahead of its rivals.53 Excessive 
rewards can also cause patent racing.54  
Given the social costs of patent grants, it is generally believed that patents should be 
reserved for inventions that otherwise would not reach the public.55 The intuition behind this 
principle is fairly obvious. While patents reduce the social returns from innovation by restricting 
the  public’s  access  to  new  inventions,  it  is  better  for  the  public  to  have  restricted  access  to 
inventions than no access at all. When firms are willing to develop new inventions without the 
promise of patent protection, the opposite is true – patents impose social costs of monopoly 
pricing without the corresponding benefit of promoting innovation.  
The  same  principle  applies  for  determining  the  appropriate  amount  of  protection  to 
award each new invention. The ideal patent term for any given invention is one that is long 
                                                              
53 See Philippe Aghion et al., Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation, 68 REV. ECON. STUD. 467, 
468 (2001). These models also suggest that offering too little patent protection in competitive environments can stifle 
innovation, and there is some empirical evidence to support this conclusion. See Philippe Aghion et al., Patent Rights, 
Product  Market  Reforms,  and  Innovation  (2013),  at  http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/aghion/files/patent_rights.pdf. 
(finding that “the product market reform that was part of the European Single Market Program in 1992 enhances 
innovation in industries that are located in countries where patent rights are strong, but not in industries of countries 
where patent rights are weak,” and that “the positive innovation response to the product market reform is more 
pronounced in industries in which innovators rely more on patenting than in other industries, and in which the 
scope for deterring entry through patenting is not too large”).  
54 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 399 (1988). Edmund Kitch argues that patents 
have the opposite effect, however, because they are granted early in R&D and therefore end the race sooner. See 
Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276-77 (1977).  Either way, recent 
empirical studies indicate that the amount of socially wasteful spending due to R&D racing is relatively low.  See 
Nicholas  Bloom  et  al.,  Identifying  Technological  Spillovers  and  Product  Market  Rivalry,  working  paper,  (2012)  at 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/schanker/bsvr_finalcopy.pdf; Paul A. David & Bronwyn H. Hall, Heart of Darkness: Modeling 
Public-Private Funding Interactions Inside the R&D Black Box, 29 RES. POL’Y 1165, 1167-68 (2000); Charles I. Jones & 
John C. Williams, Too Much of a Good Thing? The Economics of Investment in R&D, 5 J. ECON. GROWTH 65, 66 (2000). 
These  findings  suggest  that  patent  racing  is  a  secondary  concern,  although  many  legal  scholars  continue  to 
emphasize the goal of avoiding patent races as a central policy objective. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect 
Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (2004); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 439-41 (2009); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 27, at 315-16 & 327. 
55 As Judge Richard Posner once explained, “patents should be granted” when “an invention might not be made 
(not so soon, anyway) unless the inventor could get a patent,” but “[t]he balance tips against protection when the 
invention is the sort that was likely to be made, and as soon, even if no one could have patented it.” Roberts v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1345-46 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); see also Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590 (2011).  
  17 
enough to motivate its development, but no longer.56 This Goldilocks rule runs counter to many 
people’s  initial  instincts,  since  it  is  natural  to  think  that  firms  who  develop  more  valuable 
inventions should be rewarded with a longer term of protection,57 but this view ignores the social 
costs of that reward.58 If an invention needs 20 years of patent protection to reach the public, 
offering anything less will stifle its development, while offering anything more creates unnecessary 
deadweight loss (as people are denied access for longer periods) without any corresponding public 
benefit from increased innovation. Under the traditional law and economics view of patent policy, 
therefore,  the  ideal  patent  length  for  an  invention  is  usually  the  shortest  possible  monopoly 
period that still provides an adequate incentive for its R&D and commercialization.  
It is clear that some inventions need more protection than others as an incentive for their 
development, and that the importance of patent protection varies by industry.59 To successfully 
call  forth  an  invention,  the  patent  system  must  offer  enough  protection  for  the  inventor  to 
anticipate a profit from investing in its R&D. The ideal patent life for an invention is primarily a 
function of the cost and uncertainty of its R&D, the revenue streams it generates once on the 
                                                              
56 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 145-46 (defining “the optimal length of property rights” as “the minimum period 
necessary to generate monopoly profits usually sufficient to cover development costs”). John Duffy has challenged 
the orthodox view that patents should provide the minimum sufficient term of protection. See Duffy, supra note 27; 
Duffy, supra note 54, at 475-80. Duffy argues that when the patent term for an invention is more than needed to 
motivate its development, competing firms will race to secure the profits from the patent by trying to be the first to 
file their application. Since the patent term runs from the filing date, Duffy contends that these patent races operate 
as “Demsetzian auctions,” where the winner is the firm willing to develop an invention in exchange for the shortest 
effective patent life. Id. at 491. In keeping with the literature on patent racing, Duffy utilizes a “production-function 
model” of R&D investing, which assumes that R&D opportunities are common knowledge, and that firms can 
always  accelerate  their  R&D  projects  by  simply  devoting  more  resources  to  them.  These  stylized  assumptions 
consciously ignore the role of creativity in R&D and the cumulative nature of innovation. See SCOTCHMER, supra 
note 10, at 54. In reality, firms cannot patent inventions until their employees discover them, which may require 
creative insights that do not occur on a predictable schedule. Moreover, many inventions are made possible by other 
recent technological developments in the industry, which individual firms generally cannot control. Given these 
external constraints on the pace of innovation, there are limits to how early firms can discover and patent most new 
inventions, even under intense rivalry. It possible that firms could sometimes speed up their research by several 
months or even a year or two, but if the patent term is too long by five or even ten years, it is unclear that firms could 
normally accelerate their research to match.   
57 See Kaplow, supra note 27, at 1849-54 (discussing several instances where scholars have made this mistake).  
58 See id., at 1828.  
59 See supra note 1.    
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market,  and  the  extent  to  which  rival  firms  can  quickly  imitate  it  in  the  absence  of  patent 
protection.  Inventions  can  differ  dramatically  from  one  another  along  these  dimensions. 
Pharmaceuticals  costs  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars  to  develop  and  involve  a  high  risk  of 
failure,60 while many mobile phone applications (“apps”) involve significantly less risk and cost 
under a hundred thousand dollars to produce.61 It is hard to know the ideal patent length for 
either type of invention, but it is obvious that the former will require a much longer period of 
protection than the latter in most cases.  
Nonetheless, the patent system primarily operates under a one-size-fits-all framework. 
Patents run for 20 years from their filing date,62 and courts apply (roughly) the same standards of 
patentability when they award patents and determine their scope.63 Shorter or weaker patents 
would be sufficient for the vast majority of new inventions,64 which suggests that the current 
patent system subjects the public to a great deal of unnecessary deadweight loss. However, there 
is reason to believe that strengthening the system would call forth some new inventions that 
might be extremely valuable to society, including in the areas of disease prevention and clean-
energy technology.65 William Nordhaus was the first scholar to formally model the economic 
                                                              
60 See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 
180-83 (2003).   
61 See  Carter  Thomas,  How  Much  Does  It  Cost  to  Develop  an  App?,  BLUE  CLOUD  SOLUTIONS  (Mar.  2011), 
http://www.bluecloudsolutions.com/blog/cost-develop-app/ (discussing the costs of developing an application (or 
“app”) for an iPhone). 
62 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); see supra note 6 (discussing the timing of the patent term and the availability of certain 
patent-term extensions that compensate firms for some regulatory delays).  
63 See supra note 5.  
64 See MACHLUP, supra note 30, at 9; Scherer, supra note 22, at 426; White, supra note 7.  
65 See Abramowicz, supra note 22, at 1402-06 (discussing various examples of inventions that would likely require a 
patent term of longer than 20 years to be developed); Roin, supra note 22 (showing that the patent system fails to 
provide any protection for previously disclosed compounds with potential therapeutic value that have never been 
tested in clinical trials or approved by the FDA, and that as a result, they never reach the public); Benjamin N. Roin, 
Drug  Patent  Length  (2009),  at  http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-workshops/faculty-workshop-
secure/roin.workshop.paper.summer.2009.pdf (arguing that the current patent term is insufficient for drugs that 
require  lengthy  clinical  trials  to  demonstrate  efficacy,  including  treatments  for  early-stage  cancer  and  cancer 
prevention).   
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analysis  of  patent  length  when  the  government  must  select  a  single  patent  term  for  a 
heterogeneous group of inventions.66 He described how lengthening the term will lead to more 
innovation, but also creates additional deadweight loss by extending the patents on all of the 
inventions  that  firms  would  have  developed  with  the  shorter  patent  period.67 Although  it  is 
theoretically possible to calculate the optimal patent length within the constraints of uniformity,68 
this  patent  term  would  not  be  the  first-best  outcome.  The  public  would  be  better  off  if  the 
government  could  identify  many  of  the  inventions  that  need  more  than  20  years  of  patent 
protection  and  lengthen  their  patent  term,  while  providing  less  protection  to  many  of  the 
inventions that will still reach the public with a much shorter term.  
 
III.  Sequential Innovation and the Costs of Uniformity 
 
The current impetus for patent reform mostly emanates from the high-tech sector, where 
many  commentators  believe  that  patents  are  too  easy  to  obtain69 and  provide  too  much 
protection to inventors.70 These complaints are rarely about shielding consumers from the harms 
associated  with  monopoly  pricing.  They  are  about  unnecessary  and  excessive  patent  grants 
taxing  innovative  companies  and  discouraging  their  R&D  investments.71 Using  models  of 
sequential innovation (where each new invention is a steppingstone to the next), economists have 
provided a useful account of how the patent system usually has mixed effects on the incentives for 
                                                              
66 See NORDHAUS, supra note 27, at 70-90.   
67 See id.  
68 See Kaplow, supra note 27, at 1825; NORDHAUS, supra note 27, at 76. Some of the subsequent efforts to model 
optimal patent length incorporate patent racing into the dynamic, although the policy implications of this literature 
are highly ambiguous. See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS 1488-90 (2008).  
69 See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25.  
70 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1 
(2001).  
71 See supra note 12.   
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R&D. Patents provide incentives for firms to create valuable new inventions that facilitate later 
technological advances, but those monopoly rights also impose a tax on subsequent innovators 
who are building upon those earlier inventions to create better ones. These economic models 
offer several insights into patent policy that bolster the case for tailoring patent awards and offer 
guidance for identifying situations where longer patent terms might stifle subsequent innovation. 
Although there is nothing new about the idea that patents can discourage innovation,72 
the classic economic model outlined by Nordhaus does not explain how patents could have this 
effect. These classic models imagine a world where innovative firms compete against copycat 
rivals. Increasing the duration or strength of patent protection always spurs additional innovation, 
but at the expense of increased consumer deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.  
Beginning with the work of Suzanne Scotchmer, economists began to adjust these models 
to  depict  a  world  where  competition  occurs  between  innovative  firms  that  build  upon  one 
another’s  inventions.73 This  form  of  “competitive  imitation”  has  a  different  dynamic  than 
depicted in Nordhaus’ classic model. Although some competitive imitation is merely copycatting, 
rival  firms  often  try  to  improve  upon  the  earlier  invention  when  they  develop  their  own 
versions,74 and when they succeed, their inventions may push the original one off the market. 
The rival firms are free riding off the original innovator’s R&D efforts to some extent, but they 
are also investing in R&D and creating their own inventions.75 These innovations generate their 
own knowledge spillovers that will likely help other researchers to further improve upon the 
                                                              
72 See MACHLUP, supra note 30, at 10-13.  
73 Scotchmer, supra note 8; see also James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND J. 
ECON. 611 (2009); Lemley, supra note 52; Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 68, at 1501-02 (reviewing the literature); 
Merges & Nelson, supra note 52.  
74 See Bolton, supra note 34, at 32; SCHNAARS, supra note 34, at 211-26.  
75 Although the private returns from R&D spending are usually much smaller than the social returns, see supra note 
50, there are circumstances where rival firms may spend more on the R&D of an invention than it is worth to the 
public because they can profit by stealing business away from their competitors. See TIROLE, supra note 52, at 399.   
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technology.76 When this competitive imitation occurs too quickly, however, it can undermine the 
incentives for investing in R&D in the first place, and all of these benefits unravel.77 If rivals 
capture too much market share away from the original innovator before it appropriates enough 
of the social returns to recoup its investment, the innovator might not create that invention in the 
first place – leaving nothing for rivals to build upon.  
The patent system provides a means of transferring profits from the later generations of 
innovators to the earlier ones (e.g., through licensing or delaying their entry onto the market). 
When firms patent their inventions, they usually try to draft the claims to cover not only direct 
imitations of their invention, but also some of the subsequent improvements that they (or other 
firms) might make to it.78 These forward-reaching patents are a deliberate feature of the system, 
since the later technological advances made possible by an invention are part of its social value.79 
A patent on the active ingredient in a new drug applies not only to generics, therefore, but also to 
newly discovered uses for the drug, new formulations that make it easier to manufacture or 
administer, and anything else new that involves using the claimed compound.80 Although these 
later discoveries are often patentable inventions in their own right, they are still covered by the 
initial patent – giving rise to what is known as “blocking patents.”81 Any firm that develops one of 
the later inventions will be unable to commercialize that technology without paying royalties to 
                                                              
76 See Stephen J. Nickell, Competition and Corporate Performance, 4 J. POL. ECON. 724 (1996).  
77 See Aghion et al., supra note 53.  
78 For a discussion of the rules controlling the ability of firms to draft broad patent claims covering later-arising 
improvements  in  their  inventions,  see  Charles  W.  Adams,  Blocking  Patents  and  the  Scope  of  Claims  (2009)  at 
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/law/ipsc/pdf/adams-charles.pdf; Cohen & Lemley, supra note 70; Christopher A. 
Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope,  61  NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW  151 
(2005); Lemley, supra note 52.  
79 See Wagner, supra note 50.  
80 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 537 (1966) (J. Harlan, dissenting).  
81 See Robert P. Merges, A Brief Note on Blocking Patents and Reverse Equivalents: Biotechnology as an Example, 73 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 878, 878-80 (1991).   
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the firm that developed the earlier one, and the later innovator might even be barred from the 
market entirely.  
These models of sequential innovation reveal that the patent system will have mixed 
effects on the incentives for R&D.82 On the one hand, the patent system encourages firms to 
create inventions that provides a steppingstone to later advances by allowing them to extract 
licensing fees from those follow-on innovators. In some cases, the original innovators might have 
been unwilling to create their inventions without the right to appropriate a portion of the value 
from the later advances they spurred – particularly if the rivals can enter quickly.83 On the other 
hand,  these  patents  are  operating  as  a  tax  on  the  technological  advances  that  follow  them, 
potentially discouraging those later developments.84 This tax only poses a threat to subsequent 
innovation in the presence of transaction costs.85 Unfortunately, the transaction costs are often 
high  in  patent  licensing,86 mostly  because  of  asymmetric  information, 87 potential  hold-up 
                                                              
82 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 10, at 146-52 (reviewing the literature).  
83 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 68, at 1499; O’Donoghue et al., supra note 27; Scotchmer, supra note 8. 
84 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 700-01; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 
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IP rights are fragmented). The substantial transaction costs involved in patent licensing are sometimes mitigated by 
the formation of patent pools or practices of widespread industry cross-licensing. See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents 
Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1006-09 (2005) (reporting interview results suggesting 
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87 See Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform, 16 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 131, 
137 (2002) (discussing the practical barriers to negotiating a license ex ante, i.e., before the subsequent inventor has 
sunk significant R&D costs creating the improvement); SCOTCHMER, supra note 10, at 1041-42 (describing how 
asymmetric information regarding the value of the technology makes patent licensing much more likely to result in 
failure).   
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problems,88 and the fact that IP licensing often requires complicated legal arrangements that are 
difficult (and very expensive) to negotiate.89 When the original and subsequent innovators cannot 
reach a deal, patents may inhibit subsequent advances in the technologies they protect.90  
Legal  scholars  sometimes  characterize  the  literature  on  cumulative  (or  sequential) 
innovation as an argument in favor of a shorter patent term or weaker patent rights,91 but its 
policy implications are subtler. The literature indicates that excessive patent grants cause more 
social harm than previously assumed because they can stifle subsequent technological advances. 
It also highlight the importance of providing adequate protection to call forth new inventions, 
however,  since  each  step  forward  in  technology  will  lead  to  later  advances,  and  those  later 
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Conference  on  Economics  of  Technology  Policy,  Monte  Verità  (2007),  at 
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See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077 (2005); F. Scott 
Kieff,  Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream 
Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327 (2006). Patents disclose technical information about inventions to other researchers, which 
helps with the dissemination of knowledge. See Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to 
Innovate in Japan and the United States, 31 RES. POLICY 1349 (2002); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful 
Information, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531 (2012).  Patents also probably lower the transaction costs of licensing relative 
to trade secrets. See Arrow, supra note 31, at 615; Robert Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories about the 
Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1038-40 (1998). But see Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information 
Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2012) (arguing that patents are often unnecessary for transactions 
over information). The available empirical evidence – which is limited – suggests that patents are more likely to 
hinder later advances in technology when granted on inventions the public would receive anyway.  See Fiona Murray 
et al., Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of Openness on Innovation, NBER Working Paper 14819, March 2009; 
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91 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1329 & 1339-41 (2011).    
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advances will be lost if no one takes that initial step. These findings bolster the case for tailoring 
patent awards by showing that errors in either direction stifle innovation.  
When the models of sequential innovation are situated within the larger literature on 
economic  growth  theory,  they  suggest  that  scholars  have  been  underestimating  the  potential 
benefits from tailoring patent awards. It is now well established that innovation is the primary 
driver  of  long-run  economic  growth,  and  therefore  is  critical  for  the  advancement  of  social 
welfare.92 The link between innovation and economic growth is in large part due to the positive 
externalities  from  R&D,  especially  the  knowledge  spillovers  that  facilitate  subsequent 
innovation.93 When the patent system fails to call forth a new invention by offering too little 
protection, the public loses not just that one invention, but also all the future advances that would 
have come from it.94 Granting too much protection ensures that the public will receive the initial 
invention, but it imposes an unnecessary tax on the innovations that might follow, likely slowing 
or preventing some of those later advances.95 Either way, the patent system is stifling the overall 
rate of technological progress, which will inhibit economic growth. Tailoring is the only way to 
reduce the incidence of both types of errors.  
In  addition  to  highlighting  the  importance  of  tailoring,  the  models  of  sequential 
innovation provide guidance for identifying industries where longer patents are more likely to 
stifle technological progress. Within models of sequential innovation, the social costs of a longer 
patent  term  are  primarily  a  function  of  the  degree  to  which  earlier  patents  read  onto  later 
                                                              
92 See supra note and text accompanying note 47.  
93 Id. 
94 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 68, at 1499 (“[W]hen innovation is cumulative, the most important social 
benefit of an innovation may be the boost given to later innovators, and this may make the benefits harder to 
appropriate.”); Wagner, supra note 50.   
95 See supra note 84.   
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inventions, and the transaction costs of licensing.96 The benefits of a longer patent term will likely 
outweigh these social costs only where innovators need that additional protection to motivate 
their inventions in the first place.97  
Another implication of these models is that lengthening the current statutory patent term 
will have little effect on the incentives for innovation in areas where most inventions are obsolete 
long before their patent expires,98 which is probably the norm in many fields.99 Any remaining 
patent life past this point of obsolescence is relatively harmless to the public because there is no 
longer any demand for the invention. Assuming that firms anticipated their inventions would be 
obsolete prior to the end of their patent term, the additional life also probably had little effect on 
the incentives for R&D. Several prominent patent scholars have therefore concluded that the 
statutory term is probably “irrelevant” in many circumstances.100 The effective patent life for 
these inventions is determined more by the scope of their patent than the duration of that right.  
These insights from the literature on sequential innovation indicate that the patent term 
should be shorter when (1) innovation is more “cumulative” (i.e., when innovative firms must 
license a large number of earlier patents to commercialize their inventions), (2) transaction costs 
are high, and (3) firms can appropriate a significant portion of the social value of their inventions 
without lengthy patent rights. They also suggest that the patent term is less important as a policy 
lever in fields where most inventions become obsolete quickly. 
                                                              
96 See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL. 
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97 See Menell, supra note 22, at 493-95; Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 68, at 1502.  
98 See Cotropia, supra note 78, at 171-172; Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 96, at 66; Merges & Nelson, supra note 52; 
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IV.  THE MISSING FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING A TAILORED PATENT SYSTEM 
With a few notable exceptions, the government does not discriminate amongst industries 
or fields of technology when it awards patents on inventions,101 even though that protection is 
critical for innovation in some industries and may be stifling it in others.102 The patent term is the 
most striking example of the system’s commitment to the uniform treatment of inventions.103 
Congress promises a 20-year monopoly over all patentable inventions despite knowing that most 
of them would probably be developed under a shorter patent term,104 and that some inventions 
likely will be lost because the 20-year term is too short.105 The drawbacks of this one-size-fits-all 
system  are  obvious.  Nevertheless,  many  patent  scholars  steadfastly  oppose  allowing  the 
government to tailor patent awards to the needs of each industry. The core argument against 
tailoring is that the government lacks a principled and reliable legal framework for deciding 
which inventions should receive more or less protection. Most of the economic factors that are 
directly  relevant  to  the  calculation  of  optimal  patent  awards  are  not  observable  to  the 
government. Assuming observation is possible, the economic analysis of optimal patent length is 
still  far  too  complex  and  multifactorial  to  be  readily  applied  by  the  government  without 
substantial  risk  of  arbitrary  results  or  political  manipulation.  Moreover,  technology-specific 
patent laws are notoriously difficult to implement because the boundaries between technologies 
                                                              
101 See supra note 5; infra notes and text accompanying notes 331-350 (discussing some of the technology-specific 
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102 See supra note 1.  
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are  highly  ambiguous  and  mutable,  which  makes  it  hard  to  categorize  inventions  properly. 
Unless the government can resolve the inevitable line-drawing questions based on the relevant 
economic  characteristics  of  the  inventions  at  issue  (as  opposed  to  their  technological 
characteristics), firms will be able to draft their patents to select into categories offering more 
protection.  
It  would  be  much  easier  to  tailor  the  patent  term  to  individual  inventions  if  the 
government could reliably observe the primary determinants of their ideal patent length – R&D 
costs, risk of failure and future revenue streams. Unfortunately, firms do not publicly disclose any 
of the three key factors required by the classic model. The costs of their R&D projects, their risk 
of failure, or the anticipated revenue streams from a successful project are all largely unknown. 
The government could audit firms to measure their R&D expenses or the actual net revenues 
from  their  inventions,  but  these  inquiries  would  entail  significant  administrative  costs. 106 
Moreover, the audits themselves might be unreliable due to discretion exercised in allocating 
overhead costs among a firm’s different R&D projects.107 Concerns about administrative burdens 
and unreliability likely explain why the currently government ignores R&D costs and anticipated 
revenues when it awards patents. The third factor – risk of failure in R&D – is one of the 
considerations  under  the  nonobviousness  test. 108 However,  the  inherent  subjectivity  and 
technologically  challenging  nature  of  this  inquiry  probably  makes  risk  of  failure  the  least 
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observable  of  the  three  factors.109 Indeed,  one  of  the  common  justifications  given  for  using 
patents (or prizes) instead of government contracts to finance R&D is that private industry is 
better situated to evaluate the technological and commercial uncertainty of an R&D project.110  
The economic factors relevant for tailoring patent awards under sequential-innovation 
theory might be even harder to apply on a case-by-case basis. Assuming that the tailoring occurs 
ex ante, the government would need to speculate about whether the claim language in a patent 
will read onto future innovations before those innovations exist. Although the PTO may be able 
to identify patents that overtly cover a wide range of future technological advances,111 a more 
fine-grained analysis is impossible due to the limits of foresight.  
Given the government’s limited information about the features of inventions that are 
directly relevant to their optimal patent award, it would be difficult for the government to tailor 
patent length (or breadth) based on these factors.112 An obvious alternative is to link awards to 
other invention characteristics correlated with the ideal length. Since the costs and benefits of 
patent  protection  vary  by  industry,113 numerous  scholars  advocate  the  use  of  industry-  and 
technology-specific rules to tailor patent awards.114 Many of these tailoring proposals are directed 
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at software patents,115 including calls to abolish them,116 shortening their duration,117 imposing 
heightened patentability standards that result in fewer and narrower software patent grants,118 or 
create new defenses to infringement against those patents.119  
These  proposals  for  industry-specific  patent  reform  are  very  controversial.120 Indeed, 
many of the scholars who have argued most forcefully that patents are stifling innovation in the 
high-tech sectors have also argued against any industry- or technology-specific patent rules.121 
These scholars are not opposed to tailoring patent awards because they believe a uniform patent 
system is ideal.122 Their primary objection to tailoring is that the government lacks a principled 
and  reliable  legal  framework  for  deciding  which  technologies  and  industries  are  eligible  for 
greater or lesser monopoly protection through the patent system. As Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner 
explain: 
In the world of theoretical patent analysis, it is easy to show that the attributes of patent 
protection should vary depending on the characteristics of the technology. Thus, there 
appears to be a fundamental theoretical case for differential patents …. The problem with 
using this theory as a basis for policy, however, is that the technology characteristics that 
could provide the basis for differential patent treatment are typically abstract and difficult 
to quantify empirically. … So while there is a theoretical case for a system that is not 
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Chien, supra note 12, at 353-58. On February 8, 2013, the en banc Federal Circuit heard arguments in CLS Bank v. 
Alice Corp. about whether “computer-implemented inventions” are eligible for patent protection, and much of the 
oral arguments was related to line-drawing questions.  
117 See supra note 24.  
118 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 22; FTC, supra note 1; Kahan, supra note 12.  
119 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 251; Cohen & Lemley, supra note 78.  
120 See supra note 25 (citing various opponents to industry-specific tailoring).  
121 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at 203-205; PARK, supra note 25, at 162-63;   
122 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at 203-205; Long, supra note 4, at 49; Nordhaus, supra note 25, at 430; PARK, 
supra note 25, at 162-63.    
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uniform,  there  is  no  theoretical  or  empirical  basis  for  saying  specifically  how  patent 
treatment should differ across specific technologies.123 
 
The proponents of tailoring have identified a host of economic factors relevant to the 
inquiry,  but  not  an  administrable  system  for  tailoring  patent  awards  based  on  the  need  for 
protection.124 For  example,  Peter  Menell  highlights  twelve  factors  the  government  should 
consider when tailoring patent awards, including: R&D costs; technological risk; public funding 
for the research; adequacy of alternative means of appropriating the returns from R&D; value of 
patent  disclosures;  cumulativeness  of  innovation;  transaction  costs;  network  effects;  clarity  of 
patent scope; due diligence costs related to patent searches; problems related to patent leveraging 
and misuse; and other abuse problems.125 Michael Carroll adds several other considerations to 
this list, including whether the proposed rules would be administrable, and the political economy 
issues  in  their  drafting  and  implementation.126 The  difficulty  lies  in  synthesizing  these  many 
relevant factors – which often point in opposite directions – in a coherent fashion, so that the 
government’s tailoring decisions are not arbitrary or motivated by rent seeking. Of course, the 
difficulties in measuring many of these factors also remain a concern.  
An  equally  serious  objection  to  technology-specific  patent  laws  is  that  they  are  often 
unwieldy and ineffective.127 The dividing lines between technologies are porous and change over 
time. Many inventions fall within multiple distinct categories of technology,128 which makes line-
                                                              
123 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at 203-204.  
124 For example, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley outline a framework based on a variety of different economic theories 
of the costs and benefits of patenting, where the government would tailor its awards for each industry based on the 
economic theories best characterize it. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 5, at 1675-95. 
125 Menell, supra note 22, at 495 fg.1.  
126 Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Note Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1361, 1406-32 (2009).  
127 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 22, at 98-99.  
128 See PARK, supra note 25, at 162-63 (noting that many inventions are assigned to more than one technological 
category (IPC code group) on their patent because they cover several technological groupings, and concluding that  
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drawing  problems  inevitable  in  any  system  of  technology-specific  patent  laws.  Consider,  for 
example, the classification of a brain-computer interface technology, which may be more akin to 
software,  computer  hardware,  other  electronics,  medical  devices,  diagnostics,  video  game 
technology, or any other field that is likely to use these inventions.129 Line-drawing problems of 
this sort can work to the advantage of patentees, who draft their claims to select into categories 
that receive preferential treatment. When the courts tried to prohibit pure software patents in the 
past,  patentees  simply  reframed  their  claims  as  “computer  systems”  to  draft  around  the 
restriction.130 Likewise, when the PTO created a “second look” program for business method 
patents to provide for a more rigorous examination process, patent applicants reframed their 
claims so they could file their application in a different PTO division.131 A related problem with 
technology-specific patent laws is that they tend to become obsolete quickly. The Semiconductor 
Chip Protection Act is a famous example.132 Congress spent six years crafting this sui generis 
regime of intellectual property for semiconductors, but by the time they passed it into law the 
technology was already changing and the statute had become unnecessary.133  
To make a compelling case for tailoring patent awards through industry- or technology-
specific rules, all of these objections must be addressed. The government must have access to the 
information necessary for tailoring. There needs to be a principled framework for deciding which 
inventions should receive more protection than others, and the framework needs to be simple 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
“even if it were possible to design industry-specific patent systems, the patent systems are unworkable since an 
innovation is not limited to a specific industry”). 
129 See Van Erp et al., Brain-Computer Interfaces for Non-Medical Applications: How to Move Forward, 45 COMPUTER-IEEE 
COMPUTER SOCIETY 26, _ tbl.1 (2012).  
130 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 22, at 98-99.  
131 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at 204.  
132 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2006)). 
133 See Leon Radomsky, Sixteen Years after the Passage of the U.S. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Is International Protection 
Working?, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1049 (2000).   
  32 
enough for the government to administer it in a reliable and transparent manner. Finally, the 
government  must  be  able  to  base  its  tailoring  decisions  on  relevant  economic  factors,  not 
arbitrary  technological  features,  when  resolving  the  line-drawing  issues  that  inevitably  arise 
during  implementation  of  technology-specific  rules.  Otherwise,  the  public  may  very  well  be 
better served with uniform patent laws.   
 
V.  Providing  a  Framework:  the  Argument  for  Tailoring  Based  on  Time-to-
Market 
 
There is a strong theoretical case for tailoring patent awards to each industry based on 
their need for protection and the likelihood that patents will stifle subsequent innovation in that 
field.  However,  unless  the  government  has  adequate  information  about  inventions  and  an 
administrable  framework  to  guide  its  tailoring  decisions,  uniform  patent  laws  might  be 
unavoidable.  This  section  is  an  effort  to  provide  that  framework.  It  identifies  an  observable 
feature of inventions, the time-to-market, that correlates with their need for patent protection 
and the risk that patents will inhibit follow-on innovation, and that could be used to implement a 
simple and reliable tailoring regime.  
First, the paper shows that the amount of time it takes to develop and commercialize 
inventions  is  a  reliable  indicia  of  the  amount  of  patent  protection  needed  to  motivate  their 
development. Within the standard model of patent policy, the appropriate patent award for an 
invention is a function of R&D costs, uncertainty, future revenue streams, and (to a lesser extent) 
the difficulty rivals will have in imitating the invention. Time-to-market provides a signal for all 
four of these factors.  
Second,  the  paper  demonstrates  that  patents  are  more  likely  to  impede  subsequent 
innovation  when  the  average  time-to-market  for  inventions  is  short,  whereas  the  sequential- 
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innovation  problems  will  be  less  severe  when  inventions  take  a  long  time  to  develop.  The 
economic  models  of  sequential  innovation  suggest  that  longer  patent  terms  can  stifle 
technological progress in industries where earlier innovators will still develop their inventions 
under a shorter patent term, where those patents will read onto many subsequent improvements 
in the technology, and where transaction costs are high. The paper shows that these conditions 
are all correlated with the length of product life cycles in an industry – i.e., the amount of time 
older inventions are on the market before newer inventions replace them. The paper also shows 
– and explains why – the length of product life cycles is in turn a function of the time-to-market 
for new technologies. Since a shorter time-to-market strongly correlates with shorter product life 
cycles, and patents are more likely to stifle innovation in industries with short product life cycles, 
time-to-market is an indicia of the factors relevant to optimal patent life under conditions of 
sequential innovation.  
Third,  the  paper  argues  that  the  average  time-to-market  in  different  industries  is 
sufficiently observable to support a principled and reliable tailoring regime. The government can 
construct  a  reasonably  designed  system  of  tailored  patent  awards  based  on  average  time-to-
market that will promote additional innovation, avoid unnecessary deadweight loss, and avoid 
many of the situations where patents may be stifling innovation instead of promoting it. This 
time-to-market system of tailoring will provide the flexibility needed in the administration of 
technology-specific categories to avoid the complexity and line drawing problems that can be 
fatal to a tailoring regime.  
 
A.  Industry Heterogeneity in the Average Time-to-Market for New Inventions 
Most new technologies require time and effort to develop into a commercial product. 
While it is well known that development cycles in the high-tech industries are much shorter than  
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pharmaceuticals, the academic literature on patent policy tends to ignore most other industries. 
This section draws on a variety of sources to present a picture of where various industries fall on 
the time-to-market spectrum.  
Given the increasingly competitive environment in most industries, firms devote a great 
deal of effort to get their inventions onto the market as quickly as possible.134 Delays in R&D give 
rival firms a chance to capture a greater share of the market, and diminish the firms’ opportunity 
to earn a profit from their inventions.135 A 2007 report by Capgemini notes, “‘[s]peeding time to 
market’  is  a  typical  mantra  for  many  industries.”136 A  prominent  consultant  on  product 
development strategies echoes this sentiment, describing a “preoccupation with reducing cycle 
time and speeding new products to market.”137 Even firms focusing on imitation as their primary 
R&D strategy rush their development efforts to secure a viable market position; indeed, the 
strategy of competitive imitation is now known as being a “fast follower.”138  
                                                              
134 See Abbie Griffin, Product Development Cycle Time for Business-to-Business Products, 31 INDUS. MARKETING MGMT. 291 
(2002) (“For the last 15 or more years, firms have worried about, and tried to shorten, the time it takes them to get 
new products to  market.”);  Hadas  Haran,  Time  to  Market  Research:  Highlights  and  Key  Findings,  AMDOCS,  8 
(2011) available through  http://www.osstransformation.com/Time-to-Market (reporting  findings  from  a  survey  that 
70% of firms in the telecommunications industry say time-to-market is “very important” for remaining competitive 
in the field).  
135 See Vincent A. Mabert et al., Collapsing New Product Development Times: Six Case Studies, 9 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION 
MGMT. 200, 203 (1992) (“It is abundantly clear to us that the threat of significant market share gains by competitors 
was a key stimulus in improving the new product development cycles at all of the companies.”); Fred Langerak et al, 
Balancing Development Costs  and  Sales  to  Optimize  the  Development  Time  of  Product  Line  Additions,  27  J.  PRODUCT 
INNOVATION MGMT. 336, 339 (2010) (“The window of opportunity for a new product, in particular for product line 
additions, is finite. By taking too long to develop a new product, a firm may miss the window of opportunity. 
Customers already exposed to existing brands are not likely to postpone their purchase decision just to wait for a new 
product to come to market, especially if competitors already have introduced similar extensions.”).  
136 Capgemini, Speeding Time to Market, Increasing Time in Market & Maintaining Market Velocity: Best Practices in Driving Top-
Line Growth Through Innovation & Collaboration 1 (2007).   
137 R.G. Cooper, Your NPD Portfolio may be Harmful to your Business’s Health, 29 PDMA VISIONS 22-6 (2003).    
138 See  CONSTANTINOS  C.  MARKIDES  &  PAUL  A.  GEROSKI,  FAST  SECOND:  HOW  SMART  COMPANIES  BYPASS 
RADICAL INNOVATION TO ENTER AND DOMINATE NEW MARKETS 15, 119-138 (2005).   
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Although firms use a variety of different strategies to shorten the time-to-market for their 
new inventions,139 there are limits to how quickly they can complete their R&D.140 There is some 
room to speed up R&D by devoting additional labor and resources to the project, but these 
investments often have steep diminishing returns.141 At a certain point, adding more people to a 
project can actually slow it down by creating coordination problems within the project team.142 
The website for a product-development consulting firm offers the following advice to companies 
about the costs (and limitations) of accelerating R&D times:  
Time  to  completion  is  the  key  consideration  for  a  product  development  project. 
Unfortunately, the tradeoff between resources and time is non linear and occasionally an 
uncertainty. If a project takes twice as long to conduct as required, one may need to triple, 
quadruple or more the assigned resources to halve the completion time. In fact in heavily 
resourced projects increasing resources can actually slow a project down. The time at 
which this happens is called the crash point. A relevant analogy to bear in mind is three 
women cannot have a baby in 3 months.143 
 
In short, firms cannot speed through complicated and technologically challenging R&D projects 
simply  by  spending  more  money  on  them.144 Moreover,  certain  aspects  of  the  development 
process are inherently difficult to accelerate, such as product testing that requires real-world 
trials.145 Other aspects of the development timeline are simply outside the innovator’s control, 
including the amount of effort needed to satisfy pre-market regulatory standards in areas such as 
                                                              
139 See Rocha & Delamaro, supra note 36 (reviewing the academic literature on the various management strategies 
deployed to reduce development cycle times and speed time-to-market).  
140 See Mabert et al., supra note 135, at 200.  
141 See Langerak et al., supra note 135, at 338-39.  
142 See Erran Carmel & Barbara J. Bird, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Packaged Software Development, 8 J. HIGH TECH. 
MGMT. RES. 129 (1997).    
143  Sensor  Consultants,  Tips  &  Facts  –  Organizing  R&D  for  Success  (2010),  at  http://www.sensors-
research.com/articles/tips.htm (emphasis omitted).  
144 See Griffin, supra note 134, at 293 exh.1.  
145 See  Adams,  supra  note  34,  at  21-22;  Amo  van  Wingerde,  Testing  of  Rotor  Blades  of  Wind  Turbines,  at 
http://www.ontario-sea.org/Storage/26/1788_Testing_of_Rotor_Blades_of_Wind_Turbines.pdf;  infra  note  and 
text accompanying note 170.    
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pharmaceuticals, 146 medical  devices, 147 aviation  equipment, 148 life  insurance, 149 and  some 
securities products.150  
These exogenous constraints on R&D times lead to dramatic differences in the average 
time-to-market for different types of inventions. In parts of the financial industry, firm can often 
move  from  concept  to  product  launch  within  a  few  weeks.151 There  are  a  number  of  other 
industries where the average development cycle for new inventions is under a year, including 
consumer  products, 152 software  components, 153 and  insurance. 154 The  time-to-market  for 
                                                              
146 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566-567 (2009) (discussing the FDA’s pre-market approval requirements for 
new drugs).  
147 See  Riegel  v.  Medtronic,  Inc.,  552  U.S.  312,  315-20  (2008)  (discussing  the  FDA’s  pre-market  approval 
requirements for medical devices).  
148 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 603(a), 49 U.S.C. § 44704. 
149 See  Kelly  Ireland,  Life  Insurers:  Committed  to  Transparency,  Clarity  and  Ethical  Behavior  in  the  Annuity  Marketplace, 
American Law Institute, Life Insurance Company Products, SP029 ALI-ABA 235 (2008).  
150 See John C. Coates IV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 
1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 591, 632-34 (2009).  
151 See Press Release, Octavian to Launch its Innovative Financial Products Account Opener for Financial Services Companies, Jan. 
22,  2008,  at  http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/22/idUS141388+22-Jan-2008+PRN20080122;  Finance 
America  Capitalizes  on  a  Digital  Publishing  Solution  from  HP  to  Keep  its  Products  First  in  Brokers’  Minds  2  (2004)  at 
http://h10088.www1.hp.com/gap/download/FINANCE_AMERICA.pdf (noting that it is possible to create new 
financial products for mortgages “in about a week”).  
152 See ACCENTURE, INNOVATION IN CONSUMER PRODUCTS: HOW TO ACHIEVE HIGH PERFORMANCE THROUGH 
NEW PRODUCT INNOVATION 4 fg.2 (2008) (reporting that the average time-to-market for new consumer products 
ranges from approximately 3 to 13 months).  
153 See Martin L. Griss, Software Reuse: From Library to Factory, Hewlett Packard, Software Technology Laboratory, 
HPS-93-67 (1993) at http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/93/HPL-93-67.pdf (reporting an average time-to-market 
of  6  to  9  months  for  software  components);  Hadas  Haran,  Time  to  Market  Research:  Highlights  and  Key  Findings, 
AMDOCS, 11-13 (2011), available through http://www.osstransformation.com/Time-to-Market (finding that 65% of 
service providers in the telecommunications industry report that they are able to bring new products to market in 
less than 6 months); Jerry Krasner, Total Costs of Development: A Comprehensive Cost Estimation Framework for Evaluating 
Embedded  Development  Platforms  (2003),  at  http://www.eurotech-inc.com/info/pdf/total-cost-of-development.pdf 
(reporting an average time-to-market for embedded software platforms that ranged between 8 and 14 months); Peter 
Rasmussen,  Improved  Efficiency  and  Faster  Time  to  Market  with  Agile  Development  Practices  (2010)  at 
http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/global/files/danske_bank.pdf  (describing  how  Danske  Bank  reduced  its 
average time-to-market for new IT products from 14 months to 9 months); Carter Thomas, How Much Does It Cost to 
Develop an App?,  BLUE  CLOUD  SOLUTIONS  (Mar.  2011),  http://www.bluecloudsolutions.com/blog/cost-develop-
app/ (discussing the costs of developing an application (or “app”) for an iPhone); Mary Wu, Agile Method to Improve 
Delivery  of  Large-Scale  Software  Projects  (2011)  at  http://www-
engr.sjsu.edu/ges/media/pdf/mse_prj_rpts/spring2011/Agile%20Method%20to%20Improve%20Delivery%20of
%20Large-Scale%20Software%20Projects.pdf (reporting an average time-to-market of between 5 and 9 months for 
software projects in the case study).    
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semiconductors is slightly longer, averaging 11 to 17 months.155 The average time-to-market for 
a medical diagnostic test (i.e., the laboratory technologies used to perform the diagnostic) is one to 
two years156 – although it may take many years of additional validation testing to establish the 
validity and utility of the underlying correlation before insurers will agree to pay for the test.157  
While innovation occurs quickly in the high-tech industries, finance, consumer products, 
finance, and laboratory diagnostics, R&D projects routinely take several years to complete in 
many  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  The  average  time-to-market  for  automobiles 158 and 
complicated manufacturing equipment159 ranges from three to five years. Complex biomedical 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
154 See Andy Ferris, Product Development Issues: Speed to Market, Actuaries Club of the Southwest, Fall Meeting, San 
Antonio,  TX,  (2007),  available at  http://www.acsw.us/fall07/Ferris.pdf  (reporting  an  average  time-to-market  of 
between 3 and 12 months for new insurance products).  
155 See RAHUL KAPOOR ET AL., MANAGING COMPLEXITY AND CHANGE IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR ECOSYSTEM: 
FINDINGS FROM THE WHARTON-ATREG INDUSTRY STUDY 5 (2012) (“The average time-to-market, defined as the 
period from design start to mass production, is about 11 months for a revision of an existing product design. It 
increases to about 17 months for a new product design.”).  
156 See Rebecca Henderson & Cate Reavis, Eli Lilly: Recreating Drug Discovery for the 21st Century 16, MIT Sloan, Doc. 
No.  07-043  (2008),  at  https://mitsloan.mit.edu/MSTIR/IndustryEvolution/RecreatingDrugDiscovery/Doc- 
uments/07-043-Recreating-Drug-Discovery.pdf.  
157 See Pressman, supra note 160, at 15 (reporting that the average time from patenting to first royalties is 7 to 9 years 
for the gene patents held by the NIH or universities that are licensed to private industry to create diagnostic tests).  
These figures refer the to time-to-market for the correlation component of diagnostic innovation, where the patented 
invention concerns the medical relevance of a particular observable feature that can guide treatment decisions. The 
development cycles for diagnostics greatly vary depending on the regulatory environment and whether it is an 
entirely new diagnostic or just an improvement in the testing technology for an older diagnostic. See New Report 
Provides High-level Data Benchmarks in Key Areas to Help Teams Achieve Success in their IVD Development and Marketing Efforts, 
Apr. 8, 2008, at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20080408005068/en (“It is impossible to present a 
standard benchmark for the amount of time it takes to develop diagnostics products. While the evolution of some 
products takes more than 10 years, other IVDs fly through development and hit the market in less than three years. 
… IVD development time depends largely on where companies “jump off” with their new products. While some 
companies’ products  are  brand  new  technologies,  other  diagnostics  are  conjugations  of  existing  products  and 
technologies. Usually, developing an entirely new diagnostic requires significantly more time than improving on an 
existing product line. ”).  
158 See Ron Adner, Matching Your Innovation Strategy to Your Innovation Ecosystem, HARV. BUS. REV. April 2006 (noting 
that an “average OEM takes three to four years to move a car from design to volume production”); Charles H. Fine 
et al., The U.S. Automobile Manufacturing Industry, U.S. Dept. Commerce, Office of Technology Policy (1996) (finding 
that the average time-to-market for U.S. automakers was 52 months); Abbie Griffin, Modeling and Measuring Product 
Development Cycle Time Across Industries,  14 J. ENGINEERING & TECH. MGMT.  1, 2 tbl.1 (1997) (reporting that the 
average time-to-market for new cars is 3 to 5 years).  
159 See  Griffin,  supra  note  158,  at  2  tbl.1  (reporting  an  average  time-to-market  of  4  to  7  years  for  construction 
equipment and jet engines, and 3 to 5 years for copying equipment); Sarah Lubik et al., Market-Pull and Technology- 
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research  tools160 and  veterinary  vaccines161 take  five  years  or  more  on  average  to  reach  the 
market. The average time-to-market for medical devices is only two to five years,162 although 
first-in-class devices can take up to 10 years to reach the market.163  
 There are a few industries where R&D times are much longer. The average time-to-
market for radiopharmaceutical diagnostics is seven to nine years,164 while new drugs take 12 to 
16 years on average to reach the market, depending on the therapeutic class.165 Time-to-market 
for solar panel technology averages 8 years,166 and the development cycle for fuel cells is even 
longer.167 Once these inventions are on the market, it can take another decade for to reach the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Push in Manufacturing Start-Ups in Emerging Industries, 24 J. MANUFACTURING TECH. MGMT. 10 (2013) (reporting that 
the average time-to-market in their sample of high-tech manufacturing start-ups was approximately 3 to 4 years).  
160 See Lori Pressman, DNA Patent Licensing Under Two Policy Frameworks Implications for Patient Access to Clinical Diagnostic 
Genomic Tests and Licensing Practice in the Not-for-Profit Sector, BLOOMBERG BNA LIFE SCI. L. & IND. REP. 15, May 23, 
2012 (finding that for the gene patents held by the NIH or a university that are licensed to private industry to be 
developed as a reagent, the average time from patenting to receipt of first royalties was 5 years).  
161 See P.H. Flore, Commercialization of Veterinary Viral Vaccines, 5 ANIMAL HEALTH RES. REV. 239 (2004) (noting that 
“the average development time of a novel [veterinary] vaccine is at least 5 years”).  
162 See  Arthur  H.  Combs,  Medical  Device  Development:  Contrasting  Key  Elements  with  Drug  Development,  Future  Tech 
Strategies,    at http://www.bioscimn.project.mnscu.edu/vertical/Sites/%7B06AED276-B425-440B-
A665A601B55956D1%7D/uploads/%7B37FDA556-E783-4E64-AF60-71DEB5495FC8%7D.PDF  (last  accessed 
on _) (reporting that the average time-to-market for a basic new medical device is 3 to 5 years, with a minimum of 2 
years and a maximum of 10).  
163 While the average time-to-market for most medical devices is 3 to 5 years, it can be 10 or more years for first-in-
class devices. See Combs, supra note 162; Aaron V. Kaplan et al., Medical Device Development: From Prototype to Regulatory 
Approval, 109 CIRCULATION 3068 (2004) (describing the preclinical development and regulatory testing requirements 
for medical devices that make R&D times for first-in-class devices similar new drugs). 
164 See Richard G. Zimmermann, Why are Investors Not Interested in My Radiotracer? The Industrial and Regulatory Constraints 
in the Development of Radiopharmaceuticals, __ NUCLEAR MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY __ (2013)  (reporting that the average 
time-to-market for radiopharmaceutical diagnostics is 7 to 9 years).  
165 See Joseph A. DiMasi, New Drug Development in the United States from 1963 to 1999, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 
AND THERAPEUTICS 286, 292 fg. 6 (2001). 
166 See  Pennsylvania  State  University,  Materials  Research  Institute,  State“Enlightenment” on the Subject of Solar Cells 
(2006), at  http://www.mri.psu.edu/news/2006/2006_taylor_lecture/ (noting that the current time-to-market for 
solar technology is 8 years).  
167 See Panayotis Christidis, Trends in Vehicle and Fuel Technologies: Overview of Current Research Activities, European Science 
and Technology Observatory 6 (2003) (reporting that the development time-frame for fuel cells is between 15 and 25 
years);  Sunita  Satyapal,  Hydrogen  Fuel  Cells  &  Infrastructure  Technologies  Program,  Technology  Commercialization 
Showcase 16-41 (2008) at http://techportal.eere.energy.gov/commercialization/pdfs/2008_h2_fuel_cells.pdf (listing 
the estimated time-to-market (going forward) for a variety of fuel-cell technologies in various stages of development).  
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point  of  widespread  commercial  adoption.168 Not  all  clean-energy  technology  fits  this  mold, 
however. Wind power is said to have a “very short” time-to-market relative to most other clean-
energy technologies.169 In the oil and gas industry, new drilling technologies take 16 years on 
average to commercialize effectively, mostly due to the time required for field-testing.170  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is clear that the time-to-market for new inventions varies tremendously across industries 
and technology types. Table 1. Financial products and pharmaceuticals rest at opposite ends of 
the spectrum, and development cycles in software and semiconductors are much closer to the 
former than the latter. This much was already known. Some of the other figures are a little 
surprising. Average development times within the health care and biotechnology industries cover 
                                                              
168 BERNICE LEE  ET  AL.,  WHO OWNS OUR LOW CARBON FUTURE?:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  AND ENERGY 
TECHNOLOGIES vii (2009) (“Analysis shows that inventions in the energy sector have generally taken two to three 
decades to reach the mass market. This time lag is mirrored by the time it takes for any patented technology to 
become widely used in subsequent inventions. Data on the top 30 most-cited patents from each of the six sectors 
examined here indicate that it takes between 19 and 30 years with an average of around 24 years.”).  
169 RUDOLF RECHSTEINER,  WIND POWER  IN CONTEXT – A CLEAN REVOLUTION  IN  THE ENERGY SECTOR  9 
(2008). 
170 See W. Howard Neal, Oil and Gas Technology Development, Topic Paper #26, Working Document of the NPC Global 
Oil  &  Gas  Study  1  (2006);  id.  at  12  fg.IVF.1.  Given  the  long  development  times  of  breakthrough  drilling 
technologies, apparently all of those inventions are funded by the government. See Stephen M. Cassiani, Exploration 
Technology, Topic Paper #21, Working Document of the NPC Global Oil & Gas Study 1 (2007) (“[D]evelopment of 
new, breakthrough, drilling-technology advances is necessarily long-range and requires significant pre-investment. 
All of the breakthrough technologies are funded to a large extent by national governments as well as large oil and gas 
companies.”).  
TABLE 1 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
AVERAGE TIME- 
TO-MARKET* 
Financial products  Weeks to months fn151 
Insurance products  3 to 12 months fn154 
Consumer products  3 to 13 months fn152 
Software  5 to 14 months fn153 
Semiconductors  11 to 17 months fn155 
Medical Diagnostics (new laboratory test)  1 to 2 years fn156 
Complicated Manufacturing Equipment  3 to 5 years fn159 
Automobiles  3 to 5 years fn158 
Medical Devices (follow-on)  3 to 5 years fn162 
Biomedical Research Tools  5 years fn160 
Veterinary Vaccines  5+ years fn161 
Solar Panels  8 years fn167 
Radiopharmaceutical Diagnostics  7 to 9 years fn164 
Medical Devices (first-in-class)  5 to 10 years fn163 
Medical Diagnostics (new diagnostic correlation)  7 to 10 years fn157 
Fuel Cells  7 to 25 years 
fn 167 
Oil & Gas Drilling   16 years** fn170 
Pharmaceuticals  12 to 16 years fn165 
* Sources for figures below reported in notes 151-170.    ** figure includes time to widespread commercial adoption  
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an incredibly wide range of 1 to 16 years, depending on the type of technology. Patent scholars 
have overlooked the extraordinarily lengthy R&D times for many technologies in the oil and gas 
industry, and the time-to-market in clean energy is underappreciated. It is also worth noting that 
development cycles vary within each of these areas, sometimes along very predictable lines.171 
 
 
B.  Time-to-Market Strongly Correlates with the Primary Predictors of Optimal Patent Length 
 
This section argues that the average time-to-market in an industry is among the most 
reliable of signals for optimal patent life. Firms will not develop an invention that takes a long 
time to reach the market unless they expect it to generate enough revenue to compensate for the 
higher financing costs as more capital is tied up for longer and the value of future revenue 
streams is discounted by time. To make matters worse, the inventions with longer development 
cycles typically required higher out-of-pocket R&D expenses and involved a greater risk of failure. 
Taken together, these factors suggest that an invention’s time-to-market will have a tremendous 
impact  on  the  amount  of  protection  needed  to  motivate  its  R&D.  The  strength  of  this 
relationship varies depending upon the extent to which the inventor’s development efforts are 
vulnerable to free riding, but the positive correlation between time-to-market and optimal patent 
length will hold strongly under most circumstances.  
 
                                                              
171 See Coates, supra note 150, at (noting that the regulatory approval process for innovative mutual fund products 
can sometimes take years); Sophie Hooge & Armand Hatchuel, Value Indicators and Monitoring in Innovative PDM: A 
Grounded Approach, XVe International Product Development Management Conference, Hambourg, Germany, tbl.2 
(2008) (reporting R&D times for the automaker Renault SAS that ranged from 6 months to greater than 3 years); 
Sachin  P.  Kamat,  Time to Market,  1  IEEE CONSUMER ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE  40  (2012)  (reporting  that  the 
average time-to-market for software applications on mobile devices is between 17 and 26 months, roughly double 
the average R&D times reported for many other software components – see supra note 153); Mabert et al., supra note 
135, at 205 tbl. 1 (noting that several of the firms studied reported that the normal time-to-market for their new 
products was “highly variable”); McKinsey & Company, McKinsey on Semiconductors, No. 1, 58 exh. 1 (2011) (reporting 
that average time-to-market in the semiconductor industry that ranges from 12 to 16.6 months for some products to 
25 to 47 months for others).  
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1.  Time-To-Market as a Signal of R&D Costs, Uncertainty, and Future Revenue Streams 
The optimal length of patent protection for any given invention is the amount of time 
needed for the innovator to recover its total R&D investment once it has commercialized the 
invention. This figure is primarily determined by three factors: R&D costs, the probability of 
success,  and  the  revenue  streams  generated  by  the  invention. 172 The  time-to-market  for 
inventions correlates with all three of these factors. The inventions that take longer to reach the 
market have substantially higher R&D costs on average, usually involve a much greater degree of 
uncertainty,  and  generate  smaller  revenue  streams  once  they  are  on  the  market  due  to 
discounting  for  the  time  value  of  money173 and  costs  of  capital.  Time-to-market  therefore 
provides a powerful indicator of the appropriate patent term for one invention relative to another, 
and for certain types of technologies relative to others. Put simply, it is a reliable tool for tailoring.  
Ideally,  the  patent  system  should  provide  inventions  with  the  minimum  amount  of 
protection  necessary  to  motivate  their  timely  R&D.  Some  inventions  do  not  require  any 
protection, but others will not reach the public without it.174 For the patent system to successfully 
call forth the inventions that depend on it, the patent term must be long enough for firms to 
anticipate  a  profit  from  the  necessary  investment  in  R&D.175 Inventions  that  require  more 
expensive R&D need longer exclusivity periods on average to generate enough sales revenue to 
cover their costs.176 The same is true for R&D projects involving greater uncertainty, since the 
                                                              
172 See Scherer, supra note 22, at 426-28; SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 146.   
173 The term “time value of money,” a central concept in financial accounting, “refers to the economic premise that 
a dollar received today is worth more than a dollar received tomorrow,” and indicates that there is an “economic 
cost [to] receiving a deferred payment, i.e., a payment that is made after the date of the transaction to which it 
relates.”  Stephen F. Gertzman, Definition of “Time Value of Money”, FED. TAX ACCOUNTING ¶ 11.01 (2011).  
174 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 32-34, and 39-42.  
175 See Scherer, supra note 22 at 426. 
176 See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 146 (“[T]he desirable length of property rights should be higher the greater 
the development costs, other things equal.”).   
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anticipated returns from an R&D investment must be sufficient to compensate for the risk of 
failure.177 Inventions that generate lower annual sales revenues are also more likely to need a 
longer monopoly period to be profitable, since it takes more time for the invention to produce 
enough revenue to cover its R&D costs.178  
The standard economic analysis of optimal patent length provides several reasons to think 
that inventions with longer development cycles will require a longer patent term on average to 
motivate their R&D. First, the duration of an R&D projection has a direct impact on total R&D 
costs because of the time value of money. The more time it takes for an invention to reach the 
market, the longer firms must wait to see a return on their investment, which means that the 
investment  has  higher  opportunity  costs.  Those  costs  are  particularly  important  with  R&D 
projects,  since  the  costs  of  capital  for  R&D  tend  to  be  higher  than  for  other  types  of 
investments179 – especially when funded by outside investors.180 If a firm’s cost of capital is in the 
range of 10 to 12 percent, which appears to be typical for R&D,181 the anticipated time to market 
                                                              
177 See Scherer, supra note 22, at 428. 
178 See Scherer, supra note 22, at 426-28. To the extent that inventions with higher social value also generate more in 
sales revenue due to stronger consumer demand, this observation suggests that the government might want to offer 
shorter patent terms to inventions of greater social value. As Steven Shavell explains, however, there is “no clear 
relationship between the social value of an innovation and the optimal length of property rights,” since “[m]ore 
valuable innovations lead to higher monopoly profits per year, tending to reduce the period necessary to cover 
development costs, but more valuable innovations are also more desirable to stimulate (and may cost more to 
develop), tending to raise the desirable period of property rights protection.” SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 146. 
179 See Partnoy, supra note 22, at 19; Charles P. Himmelberg & Bruce C. Petersen, R&D and Internal Finance: A Panel 
Study of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 38, 38-42 (1994).  
180 See  Bronwyn  H.  Hall  &  Josh  Lerner,  The Financing of R&D and Innovation,  1  HANDBOOKS  IN  ECONOMICS: 
ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 613-618 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010). There are three main 
reasons why it is usually more expensive for entrepreneurs and firms to finance their R&D with external capital as 
opposed to retained earnings.  First, researchers may have better information than outside investors about the 
probability of success in their research, leading to a market for “lemons” problem in the search for R&D funding. Id. 
at  614-15.  Second,  reliance  on  outside  investments  creates  a  moral  hazard  problem  because  researchers  and 
managers often have different incentives than the outside investors, such as a desire for unnecessary perks or risk 
aversion in the selection of R&D projects. Id. at 615-16. Third, there are also tax disadvantages to financing R&D 
with debt as opposed to earnings. Id. at 617-18.  
181 See Frank Kerins et al., Opportunity Costs of Capital for Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurs, 39 J. FINANCIAL & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 385 (2004).   
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has  a  dramatic  effect  on  total  project  costs.182 In  the  pharmaceutical  industry,  where  it  is 
estimated that the average capitalized cost of bringing a new drug to market is approximately 
$1.2 billion, over half of those costs are due to the time value of money invested.183 Interviews of 
R&D managers outside of the pharmaceutical industry also verify that firms “are thinking about 
the cost of capital,” and that “the estimated time completion period[s] are important factors to 
support a project.”184  
The time firms spend developing their inventions also diminishes the present value of the 
future  revenue  streams  those  inventions  might  generate,  which  makes  it  harder  for  firms  to 
recoup their R&D investments. When firms decide whether to invest in an R&D project, they 
weigh the cost of that R&D and its risk of failure against the sales revenues they expect to earn 
from the invention if it reaches the market.185 The value of future revenue streams is always 
discounted  to  reflect  the  costs  of  capital.  The  more  time  it  takes  for  an  invention  to  begin 
generating sales revenue, the more those revenues are discounted. Assuming a discount rate in 
the range of 10 to 12 percent, development cycles will have a large effect on the net present value 
of most R&D projects.186  
                                                              
182  See  NATIONAL  INSTITUTE  OF  STANDARDS  AND  TECHNOLOGY  (NIST),  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  THE 
TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS OF THE U.S. BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, ch.5, 1-26 (2007).  
183 See  Joseph  A.  DiMasi  &  Henry  G.  Grabowski,  The  Cost  of  Biopharmaceutical  R&D:  Is  Biotech  Different?,  28 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 469, 475 (2007).  
184 See Roli Varma, Project Selection Models or Professional Autonomy?, 17 PROMETHEUS 269, 277 (1999).  
185 See David J. Brunner et al., R&D Project Selection and Portfolio Management, in HANDBOOK OF TECHNOLOGY AND 
INNOVATION MGMT. 216-220 (Scott Shane ed. 2008); Marcus Hartmann & Ali Hassan, Application of Real Option 
Analysis for Pharmaceutical R&D Project Valuation—Empirical Results from a Survey, 35 RES. POL. 343, 345-46, 348 (2006); 
Petri Suomala, Life Cycle Dimension of New Product Development Performance Measurement, 8 INT’L J. INNOVATION MGMT 
193 (2004).   
186 See, e.g., F. Peter Boer, Risk-Adjusted Valuation of R&D Projects, 48 RES.-TECH. MGMT. 50 (2003) (noting that the 
time value of money frequently plays a decisive role in the decisions about which R&D projects to fund); Richard J. 
Gilbert, Dollars for Genes: Revenue Generation by the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1107, 1122-24 (2006).  
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These discounting effects alone might justify tailoring patent awards based on the time-to-
market  for  new  inventions.  Indeed,  Frank  Partnoy  makes  this  exact  argument  in  a  prior 
(unpublished)  article  that  questions  the  wisdom  of  awarding  20-year  monopolies  over  new 
financial  products. 187 Partnoy  uses  a  model  of  optimal  patent  length  that  depicts  R&D 
investments as annuities, and on that basis, argues that the patent term should vary with interest 
rates,188 a firm’s cost of capital, the time-to-market for new inventions in a field and a few other 
factors.189 He notes that one of the clearest implications of his model is that development time 
has a huge effect on optimal patent life.190 Although the argument is sound, Partnoy is greatly 
underestimating the strength of the correlation between time-to-market and optimal patent length 
through his analogy to annuities.  
Unlike the time to maturity for an annuity, the time-to-market for new inventions not 
only  has  a  direct  effect  on  their  costs  of  capital  and  the  future  revenues  streams  they  must 
generate; it is also associated with higher out-of-pocket R&D expenses and greater uncertainty.191 
When an invention takes a long time to reach the market, it is rarely due to a lack of effort on the 
                                                              
187 See Partnoy, supra note 22.  
188 Varying the patent term along with fluctuating interest rates might be unnecessary because firms try to smooth 
their R&D investments to avoid any short-term changes in their workforce of scientists and engineers. See supra note 
180.  
189 See Partnoy, supra note 22 at 22-27; 43-45. Partnoy emphasizes four variables in his calculation of optimal patent 
length: the “expected flow rate of profits” (i.e., overall profits from the invention), the “structure of the expected flow 
rate of profits” (i.e., whether the profits are front-loaded), the “length of time until the flow rate of profits begin” (i.e., 
development time), and the “costs of capital.” Id. at 23 & 24. Amir Khoury offers a much briefer (and less formal) 
discussion  of  the  relationship  between  time-to-market  and  optimal  patent  length,  but  seems  to  reach  a  similar 
conclusion. See Khoury, supra note 22, at 408.  
190 See Partnoy, supra note 22 at 22-27; id. at 27 (“Conservatively, assume the difference between the timing of the first 
cash  inflow  for  the  financial  services  and  pharmaceutical  industries  is  five  years.  It  is  a  fairly  straightforward 
conclusion that the optimal patent term for financial products is roughly five years shorter than that for drugs.”).  
191 From the perspective of a firm managing a particular R&D project, the relationship between development time 
and out-of-pocket R&D expenses usually runs in reverse – i.e., firms can accelerate their R&D projects by devoting 
more resources to them. Assuming that firms are already trying to strike the profit-maximizing balance between cost 
and speed in their R&D, however, the projects with longer development times will involve higher out-of-pocket 
R&D costs on average.   
  45 
part of the patentee.192 Under most circumstances, firms try to get their inventions to market as 
quickly as possible to avoid losing market share to competitors.193 When one invention takes 
much longer to develop than another, it is usually because it involved a more complicated and 
labor-intensive R&D effort.194 Over 50% of costs in the typical R&D project are the wages of 
scientists and engineers.195 To the extent that a longer time-to-market corresponds to additional 
work hours devoted to the project, therefore, it will also correspond to higher total out-of-pocket 
R&D costs.  
Inventions with a longer time-to-market also tend to involve a much greater degree of 
technological and commercial uncertainty. Studies find that the average time-to-market for an 
invention  is  strongly  correlated  with  its  complexity,  technical  difficulty,  innovativeness,  and 
general “newness” (the amount of change from previous versions of similar products).196 Industry 
surveys find that the average time-to-market for a “new-to-the-world” invention is anywhere 
from  three  to  six  times  longer  than  for  an  incremental  invention.197 The  anecdotal  evidence 
suggests that the most cutting edge technologies take even longer to reach the market.198  
                                                              
192 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 134-136. Despite the intense pressure on firms to finish developing 
their inventions as quickly as possible, there are situations where firms hold onto their patents for the “option value” 
of developing the claimed invention in the future. See Cockburn & Henderson, supra note , at I.2 (finding that on 
average, firms hold roughly 20% of their patents for the option value of “potential future own business”). In these 
cases, the relationship between time-to-market and optimal patent life matches Partnoy’s annuity model.  
193 See supra text accompanying notes 134-138.  
194 See Griffin, supra note 134, at 293 exh.1.  
195 See Hall & Lerner, supra note 180, at 612.  
196 See Griffin, supra note 134, at 292 (“Nearly all the empirical results relating to project strategy are unsurprising. 
Newer, bigger, more complex, more technically challenging and more innovative projects are all associated with 
longer development times … .”); id. at 293 exh.1 (reviewing the literature on the factors associated with increases in 
product development times).  
197 See Adams, supra note 34, at 13; Griffin, supra note 134, at 297 tbl.4 (reporting an average cycle time of 53.2 
months for inventions that are new-to-the-world, 36 months for new product lines, 22 months for next generation 
improvements, and 8.6 months for incremental improvements).  
198 See Erp et al., supra note 129, _ tbl.1 (estimating that the time-to-market for applications of brain-computer-
interface technologies in “control devices” and  “safety & security” is 5 to 10 years).    
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Since the time-to-market for inventions is correlated with all three of the factors widely 
accepted to be the determinants of socially optimal patent length, it may be a uniquely powerful 
lever  for  tailoring  in  patent  law.  Inventions  with  a  short  time-to-market  presumably  need 
substantially  less  protection  on  average  compared  to  ones  that  take  much  longer  to 
commercialize.  If  the  patent  system  were  to  respond  to  those  differences,  it  could  promote 
additional  innovation  while  diminishing  the  amount  of  consumer  deadweight  loss  caused  by 
excessive patent grants.  
 
2.  The Option of Adding Imitation Costs to the Equation 
The only complicating factor in the otherwise unidirectional relationship between time-
to-market and optimal patent length is the extent to which the inventor’s development efforts are 
vulnerable  to  free  riding.  When  longer  development  cycles  correspond  to  equally  higher 
imitation  costs  and  longer  lags,  the  relationship  between  time-to-market  and  optimal  patent 
length will be weaker, although still positive in most cases. The relationship will be stronger to the 
extent  that  imitation  costs  and  lag  are  unrelated  to  the  innovator’s  development  time.  The 
government could tailor patent terms without considering imitation costs, but a more nuanced 
system would incorporate them into the analysis.  
The patent system tends to be much more important for sustaining private sector R&D in 
innovations that are much easier to imitate than to create.199 While scholars usually emphasize 
imitation  costs  when  discussing  whether  certain  inventions  should  be  patentable,  it  is  also 
relevant for determining an invention’s optimal patent length. A shorter patent term is more 
likely to be sufficient for inventions that are costly and time-consuming to imitate, since the 
inventor  can  recoup  some  of  its  R&D  expenses  and  reach  the  break-even  point  on  their 
                                                              
199 See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.   
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investment after its patent ends. On the other hand, patent expiration opens the door to steep 
price competition for inventions that are easy to copy, which can quickly erode the innovator’s 
profit margins. Under these circumstances, the patent term must be long enough for firms to 
earn a sufficient profit from their R&D investment before they lose their monopoly.200  
Imitation  is  usually  faster  and  less  expensive  than  innovation,201 but  in  most  cases, 
copycat firms must replicate at least some of the innovator’s R&D efforts to imitate the invention. 
There are times when the forces affecting an invention’s time-to-market have a nearly identical 
impact on the time-to-market of imitations (e.g., the effort needed to establish the necessary 
manufacturing  and  distribution  capabilities).  When  this  is  true,  it  will  substantially  (but  not 
entirely) offset the need for a longer patent term normally indicated by a lengthy development 
time,202 since  inventions  that  are  costly  to  imitate  typically  experience  less  price  competition 
following patent expiration.203  
On  the  other  hand,  when  the  economic  forces  that  lengthen  an  invention’s  time-to-
market do not have the same effect on the time and expense needed to imitate it, the correlation 
between development time and optimal patent length is much stronger. By reverse engineering 
and then copying an invention, imitators often avoid much of the painstaking work involved in 
perfecting the design of a complicated new product; and by copying the essential features of the 
                                                              
200 See  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (FTC),  EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG 
COMPETITION, Appendix A (2009) (discussing the calculation of the “break even point” for a new biologic drug 
given the heightened restrictions on generic (or “biosimilar” entry) following patent expiration). 
201 See supra note 33.  
202 Since innovators usually appropriate only a small portion of the social value from their inventions, see supra note 
49, a longer time-to-market will still correspond to a longer optimal patent length even when imitation takes just as 
long as innovation. 
203 Cf. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 90, at 1047-48 (arguing that investments in developing and commercializing 
inventions are much less likely to require strong patent protection on the underlying invention when they are not 
susceptible to free-riding imitation). It is conceivable that there is a class of inventions where longer development 
times corresponds to higher imitation costs, perhaps because firms are spending time developing their products to 
make them harder to reverse engineer.   
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original invention, they are frequently able to skip some of the costly product testing and market 
research important for commercialization.204 In most of the fields where the time-to-market for 
new inventions is unusually long, including pharmaceuticals, oil and gas extraction, and clean 
energy, much of the delay to market is due to this type of product and market testing.205 Under 
these circumstances, the inventions that take longer to develop are less likely to generate sufficient 
profits to help cover their R&D costs after their patent expires, which calls for a longer patent 
term.  
Since imitation costs are lower than the costs of invention in most cases, a longer time-to-
market will usually correspond to increased vulnerability to free riding, and thus a greater need 
for patent protection. However, unlike the correlation between time-to-market and the primary 
considerations  of  optimal  patent  length  (R&D  costs,  uncertainty  and  revenue  streams),  the 
impact of time-to-market on imitation costs will vary across industries to a greater degree. This 
suggests that any tailoring based on time-to-market should also consider differences in imitation 
costs when possible.  
 
3.  Policy Implications 
The most obvious policy implication of this argument is that patent awards should be 
much  longer  in  industries  with  a  longer  average  time-to-market  for  inventions  relative  to 
industries with shorter development cycles. Most patent scholars already assume that a lengthy 
                                                              
204 See Jonathan D. Bohlmann et al., Deconstructing the Pioneer’s Advantage: Examining Vintage Effects and Consumer Valuations 
of Quality and Variety, 48 MGMT. SCI. 1175, 1119-1120 (2002); SCHNAARS, supra note 34, at 195-210 & 218-221; Ted 
Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 360-62 (2010).  
205 In the oil and gas industry, most of the development time (and costs) for new extraction technologies is associated 
with “proof of concept” tests and field-testing. See Neal, supra note 170, at 9-10.  The development of fuel cell 
technology and many other green-tech products similarly requires many years of product testing before it can be 
commercialized. See THE FUEL CELL TODAY: INDUSTRY REVIEW 2011, 20 (2011) (noting that the development of 
fuel cell technology for cars “is not a quick process and many years of development and testing must be undertaken 
to ensure the product is fit for market before introducing it to the public”).   
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patent  term  is  more  important  for  promoting  innovation  in  the  biopharmaceutical  industry 
relative to finance, software and semiconductors. In these cases, the insight that time-to-market 
corresponds to optimal patent length merely confirms the obvious. But it also helps to place all of 
the other industries along the spectrum of optimal patent life, even when scholars know much 
less about the patterns of R&D in their sectors of the economy. The time-to-market inquiry 
suggests that oil & gas drilling technologies, fuel cells and solar panels probably need a much 
longer patent term to motivate their development compared to wind-energy technologies. It also 
indicates  that  innovation  in  the  consumer-product  industries  is  generally  much  closer  to 
semiconductors than pharmaceuticals in terms of optimal patent length.  
Another implication of the link between time-to-market and optimal patent life is that 
certain types of inventions within each industries may need more protection than others. The 
first-in-class medical devices that often take up ten years to develop presumably require a longer 
term than the incremental-improvement devices that follow it, where the average time-to-market 
is  only  2  to  3  years.206 In  the  diagnostics  industry,  where  it  normally  takes  much  longer  to 
clinically validate a medical correlation (e.g., to show that a particular drug is more or less likely to 
be effective depending on some observable variable) than to develop the testing equipment,207 the 
former may need a much longer patent term than the latter. If this is true, then the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Mayo v. Prometheus – which ruled that firms cannot patent the use of a 
medical correlation in medical practice, and instead must rely on patents covering the diagnostic 
testing equipment – may have been exactly the wrong result.208  
                                                              
206 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 162-163.  
207 See supra note 157.  
208 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 566 U.S. _ (2012).   
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Tailoring  patent  terms  within  the  pharmaceutical  industry  might  be  particularly 
beneficial to the public, since drug patents seem to play a critical role in motivating private sector 
R&D,  but  they  also  impose  substantial  costs  on  consumers  and  taxpayers.  Pharmaceutical 
companies spend tens of billions of dollars on R&D each year to developing a relatively small 
number  of  new  products.209 These  products  tend  to  generate  substantial  revenues  for  their 
manufacturers up until the very end of their patent term.210 Generics usually enter the market as 
soon as those patents expire,211 forcing the pharmaceutical companies to compete with products 
that are practically identical to their own and cost a quarter of the price on average.212 More so 
                                                              
209 See Joseph Golec & John Vernon, Measuring US Pharmaceutical Industry R&D Spending, 26 PHARMACOECONOMICS 
1170 (2008).  
210 See Charles Clift, The Value of Patent Term Extensions to the Pharmaceutical Industry in the USA, 5 JOURNAL OF GENERIC 
MEDICINES: THE BUSINESS JOURNAL FOR THE GENERIC MEDICINES SECTOR  201 (2008); Henry Grabowski & 
Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 27 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 
1, 9 tbl. 3 (2007). Drugs actually tend to be most profitable toward the end of their patent life, with peak sales 
revenue somewhere between 8 and 12 years after they first entered the market – usually just before their patents 
expire. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., R&D Costs and Returns by Therapeutic Category, 38 DRUG INFORMATION JOURNAL 
211,  219  fg.5  (2004);  Henry  G.  Grabowski  &  John  Vernon,  The Distribution of Sales Revenues from Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, 18 PHARMACOECONOMICS Suppl. 1, 21 (2000).    
211 There is an extensive academic literature on the various strategies drug companies sometimes use to keep generics 
off the market beyond the expiration of their core drug patents. Scott Hemphill and Mark Lemley recently argued 
that  the  attempt  in  the  Hatch-Waxman  Act  to  facilitate  generic  competition  through  patent  challenges  “isn’t 
working”  because  “[p]harmaceutical  patent  owners  have  responded  to  Hatch-Waxman  with  a  sophisticated 
program of ‘product lifecycle management,’ which is code for finding ways to extend exclusivity as long as possible.” 
C.  Scott  Hemphill  &  Mark  A.  Lemley,  Earning  Exclusivity:  Generic  Drug  Incentives  and  the  Hatch-Waxman  Act,  77 
ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 948 (2011). Although it is true that drug companies try to block generic entry through the 
patent system for as long as possible, most of their strategies failed. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in 
Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 354 & n.37 (2007). Indeed, a recent study by Scott 
Hemphill and Bhaven Sampat finds little evidence that these later-filed patents affect the date of generic entry, which 
they interpret as evidence that the patent system is working well in this context. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. 
Sampat, Weak Patents Are a Weak Deterrent: Patent Portfolios, the Orange Book Listing, NBER Working Paper _ (2011). The 
current concern is mostly about the use of reverse-payment settlements between pharmaceutical companies and 
generic manufacturers, which probably allows companies to delay generic entry with relatively weak patents. See, e.g., 
Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2013); Hemphill & Lemley, 
supra.  The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the legality of this practice in March of 2013. However, it is 
worth noting that despite all the different tactics drug companies have developed to keep generics off the market, the 
average  effective  patent  life  for  new  drugs  –  time  from  regulatory  approval  to  generic  entry  –  has  remained 
unchanged at 11 to 12 years. See Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 210, at 6 fg. 4; C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. 
Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327 (2012).   
212 See UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), DRUG PRICING: RESEARCH ON SAVINGS 
FROM GENERIC DRUG USE, 1, GAO-12-371R (2012). Pharmaceutical companies typically lose about 70% of their 
sales within the first 6 months of generic competition. See Datamonitor, US Most Susceptible to Brand Erosion Post Patent 
Expiry, Jan. 13, 2011, at http://about.datamonitor.com/media/archives/5293. Some legal scholars contend that  
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than in any other industry, the revenues that pharmaceutical companies earn from their patents 
appear to have a significant affect on their willingness to invest in R&D.213 Although it is not 
certain that a longer patent term would motivate additional drug development, we have every 
reason to think it would have this effect.214 Indeed, there are certain types of drugs that firms will 
rarely develop because the 20-year patent term is too short given the amount of time it takes to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
pharmaceutical  companies  are  largely  insulated  from  the  loss  of  revenue  following  generic  entry  because  they 
manage to switch consumers onto related drugs that are still patented. See Hempill & Lemley, supra note 211, 960-62. 
However, with insurers now using tiered formularies and other strategies to encourage the use of low-cost generics, 
these  strategies  are  increasingly  ineffective,  and  drug  companies  now  lose  most  of  their  market  to  generic 
competition shortly after losing patent protection. See Murray Aitken et al., Prescription Drug Spending Trends in the United 
States: Looking Beyond the Turning Point, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS w151 (2008).  
213 Scholars have been unable to devise a reliable empirical test utilizing natural experiments to measure the effects 
of patent protection on pharmaceutical R&D. However, there is a wealth of evidence from other sources that private 
sector drug R&D largely hinges on patent protection. First, given the costs of pharmaceutical R&D relative to 
imitation, it is doubtful that firms could sustain their current levels of R&D spending without legal barriers to 
imitation. According to the most recent figures, the average capitalized cost of bringing a new drug to market is 
approximately $1.2 billion, including the costs of failed drug candidates. See DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 183, at 
469 & 475. About half of those costs stem from drug discovery efforts and pre-clinical optimization and toxicology 
studies, while the other half is spent on the clinical trials necessary to satisfy the FDA’s safety and efficacy standards. 
Id. (Contrary to some reports, these figures of the average R&D costs for new drugs do not include marketing 
expenses.) Small-molecule drugs are relatively easy to copy once their active ingredient is made public, and generic 
manufacturers can rely on the brand name company’s clinical trial data for regulatory approval. As a result, generic 
manufacturers enter the market at a tiny fraction of the innovator’s costs – usually somewhere between $1 and $5 
million per drug. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC 
DRUG COMPETITION 14 (2009). The fact that drug companies are willing to spend billions of dollars on the R&D of 
products  that  are  so  easy  to  imitate  suggests  that  patents  are  critical  for  their  business  model.  Second,  the 
pharmaceutical industry is one of the few places where industry executives report that patents are essential to firms 
for recovering their R&D investments. See Mansfield et al., supra note 3, at 915; Mansfield, supra note 39, at 175 n.8; 
C.T. TAYLOR & Z. A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 199 (1973). Third, there is 
substantial evidence that pharmaceutical companies regularly refuse to develop new drugs when they cannot secure 
adequate patent protection over them. See Roin, supra note 22, at 545-56 (compiling reports from both within and 
outside  of  the  pharmaceutical  industry  that  firms  routinely  screen  through  the  compounds  in  their  pipeline  to 
evaluate the strength of their intellectual property, and will usually halt the development of any drug found to have 
weak  (or  no)  patent  protection,  almost  regardless  of  its  therapeutic  or  market  potential);  Cornelia  Tilp,  et  al., 
Prerequisites for the Pharmaceutical Industry to Develop and Commercialize Helminths and Helminth-Derived Product Therapy,  _ 
INT’L  J.  PARASITOLOGY  _  (2013) (“Before  a  company  will  invest  in  developing  a  new  drug,  at  least a  rough 
reimbursement strategy should be in place. Patent protection is a mandatory prerequisite and if no patent exists it 
has to be clear that intellectually property (IP) can be established and protected.”); Richard G. Zimmermann, Why 
are Investors Not Interested in My Radiotracer? The Industrial and Regulatory Constraints in the Development of Radiopharmaceuticals, 
__ NUCLEAR MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY __ (2013) (“Attracting venture investment in a non-patented technology is 
next to impossible.”).  
214 See Dana P. Goldman et al., The Benefits from Giving Makers of Conventional ‘Small Molecule’ Drugs Longer Exclusivity Over 
Clinical Trial Data, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 84 (2011). There is ample evidence that pharmaceutical R&D spending is 
sensitive to changes in reimbursement rates and other factors affecting the revenues generated by their drugs. See 
Margaret  E.  Blume-Kohout  &  Neeraj  Sood,  Market Size and Innovation: Effects of Medicare Part D on Pharmaceutical 
Research and Development, 97 J. PUBLIC ECON. 327 (2013).   
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complete  their  R&D  –  including  early-stage  and  preventative  treatments  for  cancer215 and 
Alzheimer’s disease.216 On the other hand, high drug prices also put strain on the health care 
system and create consumer deadweight loss.217 According to one survey, roughly a quarter of 
Americans save money by not filling prescriptions, skipping doses or cutting their pills in half, 
and  most  of  those  people  said  that  their  medical  condition  got  worse  as  a  result.218 Not 
surprisingly, questions about the optimal patent length for drugs are contentious and opinions 
differ.219 Tailoring is the only way to avoid this painful tradeoff between access and innovation.  
                                                              
215 See  Powel  H.  Brown,  Chemoprevention  Clinical  Trials:  It  Is  Time  to  Turn  Success  into  Progress,  16  CANCER 
EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS PREV. 531, 531-32 (2007); Rena Conti, Balancing Safety, Effectiveness, and Public Desire: 
The FDA and Cancer, ISSUE BRIEF #615, 2, April 2003; Jennifer J. Griggs et al., Chapter 2: Successes and Satisfaction Factors 
in Oncology Career Paths, in ACHIEVING CAREER SUCCESS IN ONCOLOGY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (Laura F. Hutchins 
ed. 2008); Ronald B. Herberman et al., Cancer Chemoprevention and Cancer Preventive Vaccines—A Call to Action: Leaders of 
Diverse Stakeholder Groups Present Strategies for Overcoming Multiple Barriers to Meet an Urgent Need, 66 CANCER RES. 11540 
(2006); Frank L. Meyskens Jr. et al., Regulatory Approval of Cancer Risk-Reducing (Chemopreventive) Drugs: Moving What We 
Have Learned into the Clinic,  4  CANCER PREV.  RES.  311  (2011);  James  L.  Mulshine,  Fostering Chemopreventive Agent 
Development: How to Proceed?, 22 J. CELLULAR BIOCHEMISTRY (Suppl.) 254 (1995). 
216 See Jeffrey L. Cummings, Controversies in Alzheimer’s Disease Drug Development, 20 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 389 (2008); 
Harald Hampel et al., Biomarkers for Alzheimer’s Disease: Academic, Industry and Regulatory Perspectives, 9 NATURE REV. 
DRUG  DISCOVERY  560,  568  (2010);  Eric  Karran  et  al.,  The Amyloid Cascade Hypothesis for Alzheimer’s Disease: an 
Appraisal for the Development of Therapeutics, 10 NATURE REV: DRUG DISCOVERY 698, 709 box 3 (2011); Zaven S. 
Khachaturian  et  al.,  A  Roadmap  for  the  Prevention  of  Dementia:  The  Inaugural  Leon  Thal  Symposium,  4  ALZHEIMERS 
DEMENT. 156 (2008); Tom Rooney, Head of Translational Research in the Neurodegeneratives Diseases Group at 
Sanofi S.A., Addressing the R&D Challenges, at Facing the Future: Developing an EU Strategy on Alzheimer’s, Sept. 21, 
2011, available at http://www.theparliament.com/fileadmin/theParliament/pdfs/ThomasRooney.pdf.  
217 Some scholars estimate that drug patents generate anywhere from $5 to $30 billion of deadweight loss in the U.S. 
each  year.    See  Aidan  Hollis,  An  Efficient  Reward  System  for  Pharmaceutical  Innovation  7-8  (2005),  at 
http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf. But see Gautier Duflos & Frank R. Lichtenberg, Does Competition 
Stimulate Drug Utilization? The Impact of Changes in Market Structure on US Drug Prices, Marketing and Utilization, 32 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 95, 107-08 (2012) (finding that gains to consumers from generic drug prices are offset by the 
reduction in the pharmaceutical company’s marketing activities and clinical research (e.g., testing their drugs for new 
indications) following patent expiration); Henry Grabowski et al., Does Generic Entry Always Increase Consumer Welfare?, 
67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373 (2012) (same); Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Does Intellectual Property Restrict 
Output? An Analysis of Pharmaceutical Markets, 55 J.L. & ECON. 151, 178-79 (2012) (same). Prescription-drug insurance 
also probably avoids a large portion of the deadweight loss from drug patents, but not all of it. See Darius Lakdawalla 
&  Neeraj  Sood,  The Welfare Effects of Public Drug Insurance (2007),  NBER  Working  Paper  Series  No.  13501,  at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13501.  
218  See  Kaiser  Public  Opinion,  Economic  Problems  Facing  Families  3-4  (April  2008)  at 
http://kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7773.pdf.  
219 Compare Goldman et al., supra note 214 (arguing that longer exclusivity periods would generate immense social 
welfare gains), with Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Extensions of Intellectual Property Rights and Delayed Adoption of Generic Drugs: 
Effects on Medicaid Spending, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1637 (2006) (questioning the gains from longer exclusivity periods 
relative to the social costs of higher drug prices).    
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The relevance of imitation costs to the analysis suggests that the relationship between 
development time and optimal patent length is itself subject to field-specific considerations. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, for example, the impact of time-to-market on optimal patent length is 
probably quite pronounced with traditional small-molecule drugs, where the costs of entry for 
generics are largely invariant to the development time and costs of the original drug.220  For the 
newer large-molecule drugs (“biologics”), however, imitating firms usually must produce at least 
some clinical trial data to establish the safety and efficacy of their products,221 which means the 
imitators need to replicate some portion of the innovator’s R&D efforts.222 Optimal patent length 
for biologic drugs is still a function of their development time, since imitators shoulder only a 
fraction of the innovator’s burden associated with longer time-to-markets, but it is a slightly 
weaker relationship relative to small-molecule drugs.223 If the government were to begin tailoring 
patent awards based on time-to-market, it might want to take into consideration the differences 
in imitation costs.  
 
C.  Time-to-Market Strongly Correlates with the Predictors of Optimal Patent Length within Models of 
Sequential Innovation 
 
The argument thus far concerning the relationship between time-to-market and optimal 
patent length builds from the standard economic criteria for the amount of patent protection 
                                                              
220 See supra note 205.  
221 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(2) (2011); see also Steven Kozlowski et al., Developing the Nation’s Biosimilars Program, 365 N. 
ENG. J. MED.  385  (2011)  (explaining  that  the  FDA  needs  to  require  some  clinical  trial  evidence  for  biosimilar 
products because biologic drugs are so large and complex that it is not yet possible to verify that two of them are 
therapeutically equivalent simply by comparing their structure).  
222 The  Federal  Trade  Commission  (FTC)  predicts  (perhaps  implausibly)  that  because  of  the  clinical-trial 
requirements imposed on biosimilars, innovators will retain between 70 and 90 percent of its market share following 
biosimilar entry, and prices will drop by only 10 to 30 percent. See FTC, supra note 200, at vi. Largely on these 
grounds, the FTC argues against a proposal – later adopted in the 2009 Affordable Health Care Act – to provide an 
automate 12 years of market exclusivity for new biologic drugs. Id. at 10-18, 23-24.  
223 Compare FTC, supra note 200, at 10-18, 23-24 (arguing that biologics drugs do not require any additional legal 
protections against imitation because imitators must fund expensive clinical trials to enter the market).   
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needed  to  call  forth  an  invention.  The  more  recent  theoretical  literature  on  cumulative 
innovation raises a different set of concerns for calibrating patent awards – the costs and benefits 
of  awarding  patent  monopolies  that  will  cover  subsequent  innovations.  Much  of  the  current 
controversy surrounding patents in the high-tech industries relates to these issues. At the most 
basic level, the patent system’s tendency to stifle subsequent innovation is in large part a function 
of product life cycles in an industry. Shorter life cycles increase the need for patent licensing and 
diminish the importance of patent protection relative to first-mover advantages. Since the time-
to-market for inventions in a field strongly correlates with product life cycle length, tailoring 
patent awards based on time-to-market could address many (and perhaps most) of the concerns 
about patents stifling subsequent innovation.  
 
1.  Product Life Cycles and Optimal Patent Length in Models of Sequential Innovation  
One of the lesser-noted implications of sequential innovation models is that product life 
cycles are relevant to optimal patent length.224 Since newer technologies eventually render the 
older ones obsolete, inventions have a finite commercial lifespan – a “life cycle” that begins when 
an invention first enters the market, and ends when it exits due to lack of demand. For the firms 
that create and sell these inventions, the life cycle of their innovations establishes the window of 
opportunity for them to earn a profit from their R&D investment. Broader patents that cover 
later improvements in the technology can extend that window by allowing patentees to control 
                                                              
224 The idea that there should be a shorter patent term in industries with rapid product turnover is fairly intuitive, 
and the argument dates back to at least the early 1940s. See Hamilton, supra note 7, at 157 (“Technology moves now 
with a speed once undreamed of—its swift march dictates a shortening of the life of a patent. Industries move at very 
different tempos—unlikeness suggests life spans accommodated to their distinctive requirements.”). More recently, 
patent scholars have argued that the short product life cycles typical in software justify eliminating software patents 
or  shortening  their  duration,  often  on  the  ground  that  the  short  life  cycles  allow  firms  to  recoup  their  R&D 
investments primarily through first-mover advantages. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 22, at 96 (citing numerous 
examples of this argument). This section builds upon these insights by using the theoretical framework outlined in 
Section III to provide a more comprehensive account of the relationship between optimal patent length and product 
life cycles under conditions of sequential innovation.   
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subsequent improvements to their invention, but may stifle those later innovations as a result.225 
Models of sequential innovation indicate that longer patent terms are less desirable when (1) 
innovation is more “cumulative,” (2) transaction costs are high, and (3) earlier innovations do not 
require a lengthy patent term. They also suggest that there is less to gain from longer patents 
when inventions become obsolete quickly.226 Shorter product life cycles are related to all four of 
these factors in ways that call for a shorter patent term, while longer life cycles have the opposite 
effect.  
The pacing of sequential innovation is much faster in some industries than others.227 All 
inventions will eventually be replaced by newer technologies, but depending on the industry, that 
process is likely to take anywhere from a few months to two or more decades.228 In a survey from 
the Intellectual Property Owner’s Association, roughly a quarter of respondents said that the 
product life cycles in their industries are typically shorter than the time it takes to get a patent.229 
Short  life  cycles  are  probably  most  common  in  the  high-tech  industries.230 In  other  sectors, 
however,  and  particularly  in  the  pharmaceutical  industry,  firms  usually  anticipate  that  their 
inventions will be on the market for decades before falling into disuse.231 
                                                              
225 See O’Donoghue et al., supra note 27.  
226 See supra Section III.B., text accompanying notes 92-100.  
227 See  L.  Kamran  Bilir,  Patent  Laws,  Product  Lifecycle  Lengths,  and  Multinational  Activity,  _  AM.  ECON.  REV.  _ 
(forthcoming); Christian Broda & David E. Weinstein, Product Creation and Destruction: Evidence and Price Implications, 100 
AM. ECON. REV. 691, 701 tbl.5 (2010).  
228 See Francesca Cornelli & Mark A. Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND J. ECON. 197, 197 
(1999); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2005).  
229 See Cockburn & Henderson, supra note 84, at C.8. The average pendency time at the PTO is between three and 
four  years.  See  LONDON ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC STUDY  ON PATENT BACKLOGS  AND  A SYSTEM  OF MUTUAL 
RECOGNITION: FINAL REPORT TO THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE 57 (2010).  
230 See FTC, supra note 1, at 45; Aaron Aboagye et al., Finding the Next $100 Billion in Semiconductor Revenues, MCKINSEY 
ON SEMICONDUCTORS 5-6 (2012) (“Fully half of the [semiconductor] industry’s revenue, for instance, is derived 
from products that are less than six months old,” and “the semiconductor industry seems to exist in a state of 
permanent deflation, thanks to its rapid innovation cycles.”).  
231 See Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, A New Look at the Returns and Risks to Pharmaceutical R&D, 36 MGMT. SCI. 
804, 809 (1990) (estimating that a patented drug has a product life cycle of 25 years on average).   
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Industries characterized by rapid product turnover may experience greater problems with 
patents suppressing subsequent innovation because the older patents are more likely to cover 
later technological advances. Innovation tends to be incremental when product life cycles are 
short.232 Since  each  follow-on  generation  of  a  technology  is  a  “smallish  step  rather  than  a 
breakthrough,”233 there is less technological space between those generations, and earlier patents 
frequently  read  onto  one  or  more  generations  of  future  advances.  The  resulting  burden  on 
subsequent innovators is multiplied when they are commercializing products that encompass a 
numerous distinct patentable inventions – i.e., when the technology is “complex” as opposed to 
“discrete.”234 There  appears  to  be  much  less  overlap  between  older  patents  and  follow-on 
innovations  in  fields  with  lengthy  product  life  cycles, 235 in  part  because  there  is  more 
technological distance separating the generations,236 and in part because foundational patents 
will be closer to (or past) expiration by the time subsequent innovators need to license them.237 In 
industries where new technologies quickly replace older ones, therefore, earlier patents are more 
likely to operate as a tax on later advances. 
                                                              
232 See C. Merle Crawford, The Hidden Costs of Accelerated Product Development, 9 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 188, 
191 (1992); Fred Langerak, et al., Balancing Development Costs and Sales to Optimize the Development Time of Product Line 
Additions, 27 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 336 (2010); B.A. Lukas & A. Menon, New Product Quality: Intended and 
Unintended Consequences of New Product Development Speed, 57 J. BUS. RES. 1258 (2004). 
233 Cf. Steve Lohr, In the High-Tech Patent Wars, an Inventor's Lament, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012 (“‘Incrementalism is 99 
percent of what corporate research and development does,’ Mr. [Stephen] Perlman said, adding: ‘Heavens, that is 
not to say it isn’t vitally important. Where would we be without it.’ … ‘The problem is that fundamental patents are 
lumped together with incremental patents. And, as the world is trying to mitigate the over-litigation of incremental 
patents and patent offices are buried under them, little guys like us are just being steamrolled over. And it’s not 
accidental steamrolling.’”).  
234 See Cohen et al., supra note 1; Levin et al., supra note 1; Shapiro, supra note .  
235 Cf. FTC, supra note 1, chapter 3, at 2.  
236 See  infra  text  accompanying  notes  _-_  (arguing  that  longer  product  life  cycles  are  associated  with  greater 
technological distance between each generations of a technology because they reflect a longer and more expensive 
R&D cycle). 
237 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 70, at .   
  57 
In addition to increasing the amount of licensing required to commercialize subsequent 
innovations, short product life cycles will exacerbate the competitive costs of those transactions, 
since any negotiation delays will eat up a large portion of their invention’s commercial lifespan. 
Industry surveys indicate that patent licensing tends to require unusually difficult and costly due 
diligence, and that the negotiations are much harder to bring to a close due to the complexity of 
the agreements and high stakes involved.238 Firms can attempt to design around these patents 
instead of licensing them, but this strategy adds time to R&D. In industries with short product life 
cycles, anything that delays the time-to-market for a new invention can be extremely costly to 
firms, since it reduces their already narrow window of opportunity to earn a profit.239 Moreover, 
unless their rivals (including the patentee) are all subject to the same delays, these subsequent 
innovators may be at a substantial competitive disadvantage.240 Some of the industries with short 
product  life  cycles  develop  institutional  responses  to  these  transaction  costs,  including  large 
patent  pools  and  massive  cross-licensing  deals  between  large  rivals.241 Many  commentators 
believe that these tactics tend to worsen the problem, however, in part because new entrants may 
be priced out of the market unless they have access to a large pool of patents.242  
The  controversy  surrounding  software  patents  provides  a  stark  example  of  how 
incremental innovation and short product life cycles can greatly exacerbate the patent system’s 
                                                              
238 See Cockburn, supra note 89, at 6 & 9.  
239 See supra note 135.  
240 See Necmi Karagozoglu & Warren B. Brown, Time-Based Management of the New Product Development Process, 10 J. 
PRODUCT  INNOVATION  MGMT.  204,  204  (1993); Langerak  et al.,  supra  note  135,  at  339  (“Customers  already 
exposed to existing brands are not likely to postpone their purchase decision just to wait for a new product to come 
to market (Ali, 2000), especially if competitors already have introduced similar extensions.”).  
241 See Mann, supra note 86, at 1006-09.  
242 See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at ;   
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tendency  to  stifle  subsequent  innovation,  perhaps  overwhelming  its  beneficial  effects.243 Most 
new inventions in software are incremental advances over existing technology, and programmers 
routinely build upon one another’s code to create these improvements.244 While the industry’s 
breakneck pace of innovation quickly renders many software patents obsolete,245 some of the 
patents  issued  are  broad  enough  to  read  onto  several  future  generations  of  incremental 
advances.246 Other firms must either license or design around these forward-reaching patents.247 
The resulting delays and cost increases in R&D have become painfully apparent to most people 
in the industry. There are reports that up to 80% of software engineers now believe patents are 
slowing down innovation in their field.248 
  The tax on subsequent innovation from earlier patents would be a necessary evil if it were 
essential to call forth those earlier inventions, but lengthy patent terms tend to be less important 
in industries with rapid product turnover.249 Critics of software patents raise this very argument 
                                                              
243 See  Julie  Samuels,  Oracle v. Google Shows the Folly of U.S. Software Patent Law,  WIRED,  Apr.  23,  2012;  David  A. 
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Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (Dept. of Justice, F.T.C. 2007), Chapter 8E. Antitrust and Misuse 
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to explain why a shorter (or no) patent term would be sufficient R&D in that industry.250 The 
first-to-market  usually  has  a  head  start  in  the  race  to  produce  the  next  generation  of  their 
invention, and in a field where product life cycles are short, rivals have much less time to catch 
up.251 Innovators can maintain (relatively) high profit margins by continually staying ahead of 
their  rivals.252 An  innovator’s  head  start  over  its  rivals  is  less  significant  in  industries  with 
extended product life cycles, which forces firms to rely on patent protection (or other barriers to 
imitation) to appropriate the returns to their R&D.253  
Longer patent terms have smaller beneficial effects on R&D spending in industries with 
shorter life cycles not only because there are greater first-mover advantages in those fields, but 
also  because  most  of  their  inventions  become  obsolete  before  their  patents  expire.254 As  the 
author of a treatise on patent law (and practicing patent attorney) explains:  
The term of available patent protection is more important in some industries than others. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, for example, where it takes many years for a product to reach the market, 
and where the same product, once introduced, can usually be sold for 20 years or more, it is vital 
to the patentee to obtain as long a patent term as possible. On the other hand, in an industry in 
which products can be brought to market quickly but are rapidly replaced by newer products, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
LERNER, supra note 25, at 57; Samuelson et al., supra note 24, at ; Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting By 
Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 111, 137 (2010).   
250 See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 22, at 96 (“Most commonly, scholars suggest that the rapid market cycles in 
software justify shorter terms of protection for software patents.”);  Menell, supra note 12; Mark Aaron Paley, Article: 
A Model Software Petite Patent Act, 12 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 301, 306 (1996); Samuelson et al., supra note 24, 
at  2408;  Michael  Valek,  Should  Software  Patents  have  Shorter  Life  Spans  than  Other  Patents?,  CNET,  Apr.  11,  2008 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13796_3-9917345-79.html  (reporting  that  Federal  Circuit  Judge  Pauline  Newman 
suggested that a patent term of 5 to 6 years for software might make ore sense); Prepared Testimony and Statement 
for the Record of Jim Warren Before the Patent and Trademark Office (Jan. 26-27, 1994).  
251 See FTC, supra note 1, at ch 1, 35 n.224.  
252 See Aghion et al., supra note 53, at 468.  
253 A recent study by Kamran Bilir tests this proposition by looking at which multinational firms are more likely to 
locate their manufacturing in countries with weaker IP protection, and finds that product life cycle length is one of 
the most important predictors. See Bilir, supra note 227.  
254 See supra text accompanying notes 98-100; U.S. Pat. No. 7,949,581 “Method of determining an obsolescence rate 
of a technology,” (May 24, 2011) (“The rate of patent obsolescence varies from technology to technology. Typically, 
faster-paced  technologies,  such  as  computer-electronics  and  software,  decline  more  rapidly  than  slower-paced 
technologies, such as basic materials and simple mechanical technologies.”).   
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patentee is more interested in obtaining rapid grant of an enforceable patent than in prolonging 
patent term.255 
 
Although  a  small  percentage  of  the  patents  issued  in  short  life  cycle  industries  will  generate 
income throughout the patent term, the rapid pace of technological change in these industries 
suggests that much of these profits are a windfall.256 When firms are deciding whether to invest in 
an R&D project, they are probably much less likely to anticipate substantial patent royalties 
twenty years in the future when the technological landscape will be markedly different five or ten 
years out. Interestingly, it appears that in industries with short product life cycles (particularly the 
high-tech industry), most of the patent litigation that occurs toward the end of the patent term 
involves  non-practicing  entities  that  specialize  in  licensing  (“patent  trolls”),  as  opposed  to 
manufacturing firms trying to protect their market.257   
 
2.  Tailoring based on Time-to-Market as a Proxy for Product Life Cycles  
The relationship between optimal patent length and product life cycles outlined above 
suggests that the government might want to tailor patent awards based on the rate of product 
turnover in an industry. This additional layer of complexity is unnecessary. Product life cycles are 
closely correlated with the time-to-market for new inventions. Tailoring based on time-to-market 
                                                              
255 PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY: FUNDAMENTALS OF 
GLOBAL LAW, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 7 (4th ed. 2004).  
256 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at 57-58.  
257 See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls without 
Harming Innovators?, U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming). The social utility of the patent licensing and litigation practices 
of non-practicing entities that buy up older patents is the subject of debate. Id. Some of this behavior is almost 
certainly welfare reducing, however. There are growing reports of patent trolls using software patents of dubious 
validity  to  essentially  “extort”  money  from  more  innovative  companies  by  leveraging  the  high  costs  of  patent 
litigation to extract modest licensing fees from numerous other firms. See Gene Quinn, Extortion Patent Style: Small 
Business in the Troll Crosshairs, IPWatchdog, May 24, 2011, at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/05/24/extortion-
patent-style-small-business-in-the-troll-crosshairs/id=17425/; Mike Lee, Software Patents are Legalized Extortion, ZDNet, 
Oct. 30, 2011, at  http://www.zdnet.com/software-patents-are-legalised-extortion-3040094260/; Jonathan Potter, 
Remarks of Alliance President Jonathan Potter at the First USPTO Software Patent Roundtable, U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office Software Patent Roundtable (2012), at  http://appdevelopersalliance.org/news/2013-02-12-JPotterRemarks.  
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should achieve roughly the same outcome, helping to avoid situations where longer patents will 
inhibit innovation while providing sufficient protection in areas where early innovators rely on 
those patent rights.  
a. Time-to-market is strongly correlated with product life cycles.—The available data on product 
life cycles in various industries is much thinner than the data on time-to-market, but it is clear 
that the two are tightly correlated to one another. Evidence for this relationship mostly comes 
from industry surveys on the time-to-market of new products. Management scholars have been 
using surveys to acquire project-level data on R&D times since the late 1980s, when scholars first 
began to argue that shortening the time-to-market was critical for firms to remain competitive.258 
Within this survey literature, scholars have found that time-to-market “strongly correlates” with 
product life cycle length, both within and across firms.259  
The reported product life cycle times in various industries also matches up well with the 
average  development  times  in  those  industries  relative  to  others.  Cycle  times  appear  to  be 
shortest  in  the  fields  where  new  inventions  reach  the  market  quickly,  such  as  consumer 
products,260 software,261 semiconductors (and computer hardware),262 which tend to be obsolete 
within a few years of entering the market. Although the inventions embodied in these products 
sometimes have a longer life cycle than the products themselves, estimates of patent life cycle 
                                                              
258 See Abbie Griffin, Legitimizing Academic Research in Design: Lessons from Research on New Product Development and Innovation, 
28 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 428 (2011). 
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262 See Aaron Aboagye et al., Finding the Next $100 Billion in Semiconductor Revenues, MCKINSEY ON SEMICONDUCTORS 
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length  in  these  industries  (based  on  mean  citation  lag)  confirm  that  they  are  some  of  the 
shortest.263 Meanwhile,  it  often  takes  20  or  more  years  for  inventions  to  become  obsolete  in 
pharmaceuticals, 264 oil  &  gas  exploration, 265 and  some  clean-energy  technology, 266 where 
development cycles are longest.267 The relationship between development time and product life 
cycles also seems to hold for inventions within a given industry. In medical devices, for example, 
the life cycle for foundational patents on new-to-the-world devices can last well over a decade, 
while the cycle time for incremental improvements in those devices is roughly two years268 – 
corresponding well to the difference in their development times.269  Product life cycles are also 
much longer with fuel cells and solar technology relative to wind energy.270  
At first glance, evidence of the relationship between development cycles and product life 
cycles is not particularly surprising. The reason most inventions become obsolete is that newer 
technologies entered the market to replace them. When it takes a long time for firms to develop 
and commercialize new inventions, the old ones should stay on the market for longer. This 
explanation for the relationship is incomplete, however. Firms could speed up the introduction of 
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new inventions (thereby shortening product life cycles) by initiating new R&D projects at a faster 
rate. If firms begin working on the next generation of a technology every two years, then they will 
be introducing those new products in a two-year cycle, even if each one of those inventions takes 
a long time to develop.  
The reason that time-to-market is correlated with life cycle length ultimately is the same 
reason time-to-market is correlated with optimal patent length under the standard economic 
models. An extended time-to-market makes inventions far less profitable, all else equal, because it 
drives up R&D costs while diminishing the value of future revenue streams from the resulting 
inventions, and is associated with higher out-of-pocket R&D expenses and greater uncertainty.271 
Firms must compensate for these higher costs and risks relative to the reward by directing their 
R&D efforts to areas where consumer demand is stronger and there is less competition. This 
strategy usually involves developing inventions that will provide consumers with substantially 
more value relative to what is available from current technologies, since they need to be able to 
charge higher prices to support the necessary R&D investment. Lengthy development cycles 
should therefore be associated with greater technological distance between sequential innovators. 
Moreover, because “new to the world” inventions take much longer to develop than incremental 
ones,272 the older technologies stay on the market for longer.  
b.  Sequential  innovation  and  the  benefits  of  tailoring  based  on  time-to-market.—Tailoring  patent 
awards  based  on  development  time  should  address  many  of  the  considerations  relevant  to 
optimal patent life within models of sequential innovation. To the extent that shorter times-to-
market result in faster product life cycles, they create an environment of overlapping patents and 
                                                              
271 See supra Section V.B.1.  
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increase  the  need  for  licensing,  while  also  exacerbating  the  relative  transaction  costs  of 
negotiating  those  agreements.273 At  the  same  time,  the  shorter  time-to-market  increases  the 
likelihood that a shorter (or no) patent term will be sufficient to motivate R&D investments. 
Those inventions typically need less patent protection because they require less expensive and 
risky  R&D  investments  relative  to  the  future  revenues  they  generate.274 They  also  need  less 
protection  because  their  shorter  product  life  cycle  increases  the  effectiveness  of  first-mover 
advantages  as  an  appropriation  strategy.275 Moreover,  the  shorter  life  cycles  diminishes  the 
likelihood that firms will spend more on R&D in anticipation of future revenue streams 10 or 20 
years later given the fast obsolescence rate and rapidly changing technological environment.276 
The recent study by Brian Love hints that shorter times-to-market will even correspond to the 
risk of “patent troll” litigation277 – and finds that most of that litigation occurs late in the patent 
term.278  
The relationship between time-to-market and product life cycle length also suggests the 
patent term has the potential to be a much more effective policy lever than currently assumed. If 
there  is  a  particular  technological  area  where  the  patent  system  currently  provides  too  little 
protection against imitation, lengthening the patent term is essentially pointless unless the life 
cycle of those inventions is longer than the current statutory term. Much of the recent literature 
on optimal patent length assumes that these situations are rare, since most inventions have a 
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relatively  short  life  cycle.279 Given  the  strong  correlation  between  optimal  patent  length  and 
development  time,280 this  view  underestimates  the  relevance  of  patent  length  as  a  means  of 
spurring innovation. Inventions with long development cycles are more likely to need additional 
protection to motivate their R&D, and because longer development cycles usually result in longer 
product life cycles, those same inventions are much more likely to be impacted by increasing the 
patent term. In short, as an invention’s time-to-market increases and firms need stronger patent 
protection  on  average  to  recoup  their  R&D  investment  (relative  to  inventions  with  short 
development cycles), patent length becomes a more effective policy lever.  
Models of sequential innovation greatly strengthen the case for tailoring patent awards 
based on time-to-market, but even without these insights, the observed variations in product life 
cycle length alone suggest that a tailored patent term is preferable. Providing the same duration 
of  patent  protection  to  inventions  regardless  of  life  cycle  length  is  necessarily  distortionary 
because it allows firms to appropriate a larger portion of their invention’s social value if it has a 
shorter life cycle. When an invention becomes obsolete before its patent expires, the patentee 
appropriates a portion of that invention’s value throughout its entire economic lifespan. Patents 
provide  a  more  limited  right  of  appropriation  for  inventions  that  remain  in  use  beyond  the 
statutory patent term. The patents on these inventions do not encompass their full economic 
lifespan, and the patentees therefore capture a smaller portion of the social value. This policy is 
particularly problematic given that life cycle length and development cycle are closely correlated. 
Inventions with a shorter time-to-market need less protection, not more. 
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D.  Time-to-Market is Sufficiently Observable to Support a System of Tailored Patent Awards 
 
The core objection to tailoring patent awards is not based on a defense of the status quo, 
but rather on the inability to identify a principled and administrable system for the government 
to apply in determining which inventions need more protection than others. Many of the nation’s 
most respected patent scholars have essentially given up hope on the prospect of a tailored patent 
system.281 Clarissa Long may have captured this sentiment best when she opined, “The same 
might be said of a unitary patent system that Winston Churchill famously said about democracy: 
It’s the worst form of patent system, except for all the others that have been tried.”282 Or as 
William Nordhaus concluded, “a fixed patent life is not optimal in theory, although it may be 
unavoidable in practice.”283 The arguments outlined above suggests not only that it is possible to 
have a socially beneficial system of tailored patent awards, but that it would be much easier than 
anyone seems to have imagined. The optimal patent award for inventions strongly correlates 
with an easily observable feature – the time-to-market. With a reasonably designed system of 
tailored  patent  awards  based  on  the  average  time-to-market  for  different  technologies  and 
industries, the government could greatly enhance the patent system’s performance.  
Time-to-market  provides  a  simple,  reliable,  and  transparent  signal  of  optimal  patent 
length that can be used to determine which types of inventions should receive more or less 
protection relative to one another and the current 20-year baseline. As shown in the previous 
sections of this paper, time-to-market correlates with most of the economic criteria affecting the 
optimal  reward,  thereby  avoiding  the  need  for  a  much  more  complicated  and  error-prone 
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inquiry  into  the  economics  of  innovation  in  each  industry.284 There  is  also  less  room  for 
favoritism in setting rewards when the tailoring is based on a single variable, especially if that 
variable is observable to the public.  
In theory, the government could estimate the time-to-market for each patented invention 
to determine its award. Compared to almost all of the other economic factors relevant to optimal 
patent life, development time is a relatively observable characteristic, at least for most inventions. 
R&D usually leaves a trail of documentation and work product that could be used to determine 
the project’s start-date.285 Even simpler, the government could rely on the filing date on the 
inventor’s patent as a rough proxy for the start of R&D, since firms usually file their applications 
early in development.286 The date of commercialization is usually a public event, making it fairly 
easy to identify in most cases. Indeed, the patent system already inquires into this date when it 
applies the prior sale bar.287  
Tailoring  patent  awards  based  on  an  estimate  of  the  actual  time-to-market  for  each 
invention would create several problems, however. It might allow firms to game the system by 
slowing down their R&D projects to lengthen their patent term,288 or reward firms that sit on 
their patent rights for an extended period of time before developing the claimed invention. More 
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importantly, the PTO receives over half a million patent applications each year.289 Trying to 
calculate the time-to-market for all of them would entail significant administrative costs.  
Instead  of  tailoring  patent  awards  based  on  the  actual  time-to-market  of  each  new 
invention,  the  government  could  use  the  average  time-to-market  for  that  type  of  technology 
within the relevant industry. The average time-to-market in a particular field is relatively easy for 
the  government  to  observe.  Given  private  industry’s  “preoccupation”  with  getting  their 
inventions to the market as quickly as possible,290 figures on the time-to-market for new products 
receive a lot of attention and tend to be widely known within industries.291 The government 
could put together a reasonably accurate estimate of the average time-to-market in different fields 
using  publicly  available  information  alone.    The  system  would  work  better,  however,  if  the 
government had accurate estimates of the average development times for the different categories 
of technology within each industry. To improve its estimates, the government could commission 
its own studies to acquire technology-specific averages within each field.  Most firms already 
maintain  careful  records  of  the  duration  of  their  own  R&D  projects  for  internal  evaluation 
purposes, 292 so  the  figures  necessary  for  estimating  the  average  time-to-market  for  most 
technologies will already exist. The government just needs to request them.293  
Crucially, this system of tailoring patent awards based on time-to-market would allow the 
government  to  resolve  the  line-drawing  questions  that  inevitably  arise  when  implementing 
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submitted  by  one  company  would  be  watered  down  when  the  government  computed  the  industry  average. 
Moreover, fraudulent figures might look suspicious to the government when it has access to other firm’s reported 
times-to-market, so the risk of detection might be high. If the government is still worried about fraud, it could use the 
threat of random audits to encourage truthful reporting.   
  69 
technology-specific rules.294 The boundaries between different fields of technology are inherently 
ambiguous  and  tend  to  shift  over  time.  To  successfully  implement  technology-specific  rules, 
therefore,  the  government  must  be  able  to  address  any  line-drawing  questions  through  an 
administrable, policy-based analysis. The time-to-market for inventions is sufficiently observable 
that the government can use it to prevent firms from designing around the technology-specific 
rules by drafting their patent claims to select into advantageous categories. The government 
could adapt its rules quickly to account for significant changes in the average time-to-market in 
an industry. It could even create carve-out categories that will protect the inventions that take 
much longer to reach the market than the average invention in their class. For example, it might 
be beneficial to allow exemptions for breakthrough inventions, which often need more protection 
than the incremental advances in their field due to a longer time-to-market and greater risk of 
failure.295  
The purpose of this paper is not to specify the exact details of how the government might 
tailor patent awards based on the time-to-market of inventions. The correlation between time-to-
market and optimal patent length provides the foundation for an administrable system of tailored 
patent awards, and the government could implement that system in a variety of different ways. 
Indeed, there are dozens of different policy levers that the government might use to tailor its 
patent  awards  based  on  time-to-market.  While  this  paper  focuses  on  the  patent  term,  the 
government could also adjust the criteria for patentability, the breadth of patent rights, defenses 
to  infringement,  patent  filing  and  maintenance  fees,  the  stringency  of  PTO  examinations, 
antitrust doctrines, and a host of other rules. The tailoring could even occur outside of the patent 
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system through government subsidies or taxes, prizes, or regulatory barriers to entry.296 Decisions 
about  how  to  tailor  patent  awards  could  be  made  by  Congress,  agencies,  courts,  or  some 
combination of these actors.297 Although there is virtue in simplicity, the government’s tailoring 
framework does not need to be based exclusively on time-to-market. If it has access to other 
relevant information that could be incorporated into a reliable framework for determining which 
inventions warrant greater protection than others, those factors can (and should) be considered. 
Variations in the time-to-market for inventions provide a solid foundation for tailoring patent 
awards, but the framework could be enriched when appropriate.  
 
VI.  Other Objections to Tailoring Patent Awards  
 
Patent scholars occasionally raise two additional objections to tailoring patent awards 
through technology-specific rules. The first is that any “discriminatory” treatment of inventions 
within patent law violates the TRIPS agreement, particularly if it involves a variable patent term. 
This argument is probably correct as a doctrinal matter, but it is not clear if other countries 
would want to enforce the TRIPS requirements against the U.S. in this context, and if they did, 
it is likely that there would not be any meaningful sanction for non-compliance. The second 
objection is that any attempt to craft technology-specific laws would lead to extensive lobbying by 
industry groups for special protections, ultimately producing a worse set of laws that the current 
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Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1128 
(2003). However, a number of scholars now support using the courts or regulators craft rules that would tailor patent 
awards that account for the particular circumstances of each industry and field of technology. See Burk & Lemley, 
supra note 5; Burstein, supra note 22; Johnson, supra note 22; Masur, supra note 22; cf. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. 
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uniform  provisions.  Although  the  concerns  about  rent  seeking  are  legitimate,  this  argument 
greatly exaggerates the danger posed by any break with the current one-size-fits-all patent system.  
 
A.  The TRIPS Objection 
The first objection lodged against proposals for a variable patent term or any technology-
specific  patent  law  is  usually  that  it  would  violate  the  TRIPS  Agreement.298 Unless  the 
technology-specific laws would cause economic injury to other countries by lowering their trade 
exports to the U.S., there might not be any sanction for this violation. TRIPS provides a reason 
not to shorten the patent term in areas where foreign firms unambiguously benefit from patent 
protection (e.g., in the pharmaceutical industry), but not elsewhere.  
The TRIPS agreement requires WTO member nations to have a patent term of at least 
“twenty years counting from the filing date,”299 and to ensure that patent rights are “enjoyable 
without  discrimination  as  to  …  the  field  of  technology.”300 Scholars  have  debated  whether 
countries  can  have  technology-specific  patent  laws  without  crossing  the  line  into 
“discrimination,”301 but no one has argued that countries can shorten the patent term for some 
inventions. 302 As  Rochelle  Dreyfuss  and  Graeme  Dinwoodie  explain,  TRIPS  “makes  the 
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Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 111-112 (2007). 
299 TRIPS, art. 33, 93-94. 
300 Id., art. 27(1).  
301 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of 
the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 445 (2007) 
302 See,  e.g.,  Colleen  Chien,  Tailoring  the  Patent  System  to  Work  for  Software  and  Technology  Patents,  WIRED.COM, 
(forthcoming  2013)  (arguing  that  the  TRIPS  antidiscrimination  provision  allows  for  much  more  flexibility  than 
commonly assumed in adopting technology-specific patent laws, but not so far as to permit a variable patent term).  
  72 
required  term  crystal  clear.”303 This  argument  helped  stifle  otherwise  popular  proposals  to 
shorten the term of protection for software patents during the legislative debates leading up to the 
2011 America Invents Act.304  
This objection to technology-specific patent laws does not deserve the weight it has been 
given. TRIPS may carry the normative force of an international agreement,305 but it is not biding 
U.S. law, and the WTO mechanisms for inducing compliance are relatively weak.306 The only 
way to enforce the TRIPS requirements is through a WTO dispute resolution panel, and only 
member nations (not individuals) have standing to bring a complaint.307 Assuming that another 
country  would  want  to  challenge  differential  patent  terms,  it  would  take  years  for  them  to 
prosecute their case to an actionable ruling,308 and even then, the WTO cannot force the U.S. to 
change its laws or to pay damages to the injured nation.309 The only remedy would be the right 
to impose retaliatory sanctions against the U.S.310 The WTO has already ruled against the U.S. 
                                                              
303 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 303, at 454 n.39 (arguing that TRIPS provides (or should provide) much more 
for technology-specific laws than is commonly assumed, but “Members would not have complete discretion. For 
example, we doubt that they could curtail the term of a patent”).  
304 See Chien, supra note 302 (“While this [antidiscrimination] clause hasn’t attracted much attention, for years it has 
stymied popular proposals like abolishing software patents or putting a 5-year limit on them. ‘Because it’s illegal 
under TRIPS,’ is a common refrain heard on Capitol Hill.”).  
305  See  ABRAM  CHAYES  &  ANTONIA  HANDLER  CHAYES,  THE  NEW  SOVEREIGNTY:  COMPLIANCE  WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 116 (1995). 
306 See Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law Enforcement, 80 GEO. L. REV. 102 
(2011) (arguing that that the sheer amount of time it takes for nations to secure a judgment and enforceable remedy 
before the WTO, combined with the absence of any damages for past injuries in that remedy, creates a substantial 
under-deterrence problem for WTO law).  
307 TRIPS, supra, art. 64(1). For a discussion of the logic underlying these rules, see Alan O. Sykes, Public versus Private 
Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631 (2005).   
308 See Brewster, supra note 306.  
309 See  Alan  O.  Sykes,  Trade Remedy Laws,  in  RESEARCH  HANDBOOK  IN  INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC  LAW  62 
(Andrew T. Guzman & Alan O. Sykes eds. 2007).  
310 See Brewster, supra note 306, at 109-110 (describing the available remedies for trade violations within the WTO);   
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in two separate cases involving U.S. laws that allegedly violate TRIPS, and in both instances, the 
U.S. has refused to modify its non-compliant policy.311  
The  WTO  remedies  are  particularly  weak  in  this  context,  where  Congress  would  be 
tailoring  the  patent  system  to  promote  R&D  spending  in  private  industry.  Assuming  that 
excessive patent grants are stifling innovation and reducing the returns from R&D investments in 
certain  fields,  as  many  people  believe,312 shortening  the  patent  term  for  some  (or  all)  of  the 
inventions in those areas would probably increase industry profits. That policy would still violate 
TRIPS,  but  under  the  (somewhat  ambiguous)  WTO  rules,  it  appears  that  any  retaliatory 
sanctions would need to be tied to the complaining nation’s overall loss in trade exports caused 
by the non-compliant policy.313 There is no injury if foreign and domestic firms both benefit from 
new law. Indeed, foreign firms in the high-tech sector probably have the most to gain from a 
shorter patent term. They typically hold fewer U.S. patents than their domestic counterparts314; 
they are less likely to enforce their U.S. patents in court315; and they tend to do poorly in patent 
                                                              
311 See Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defiance: The WTO Compliance Scorecard, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
401, 411-12 (2011).  
312 See,  e.g.,  BESSEN  &  MEURER,  supra  note  22,  at  (concluding  based  on  litigation-event  studies  that  patent 
enforcement overall has a negative effect on firm value in industries outside of pharmaceuticals and chemicals). 
313 See supra note 310; Alan O. Sykes, Optimal Sanctions in the WTO: The Case for Decoupling (and the Uneasy Case for the 
Status  Quo),  Stanford  Law  and  Economics  Olin  Working  Paper  No.  379.  Available  at  SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444589.  
314 See James Bessen & Rober M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157, 
170 (2007); Bronwyn H. Hall, Exploring the Patent Explosion, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 35 (2005) (reporting that the 
“explosion” in U.S. patent rates during the 1980s and 90s was almost entirely due to an increase in patenting by 
U.S. firms in the high-tech sectors); Gaetan De Rassenfosse et al., The Worldwide Count of Priority Patents: A New Indicator 
of Inventive Activity, ECARES Working Paper 2012-019 (2012) (noting that “USPTO patent counts are strongly biased 
in favour of US and Canadian inventors, owing to the high propensity of North American applicants to file patents 
at that patent office”). 
315 See Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1504-05 (2003) (“Although foreign 
inventors acquire 45% of patent rights annually, they seek to enforce their patent rights in only 13% of the litigated 
cases.”).   
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cases tried to a jury.316 Under most circumstances, therefore, the TRIPS requirements should not 
stop Congress from tailoring patent awards for the purpose of promoting innovation.317 
 
B.  The Political Economy Objection 
Another frequent objection to tailoring patent awards through technology-specific rules is 
that it would open up the floodgates to industry rent seeking. These concerns are legitimate, but 
they are less worrisome here than in most other areas of industrial policy, since there tends to be 
less distance between private industry’s interests and the public interest in the context of patent 
reform.318 Most of the technology-specific patent laws on the books are thought to be beneficial, 
including the set of drug-patent provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act, which (despite their flaws) 
are widely seen as a great triumph of public policy. The current 20-year term of protection and 
other  untailored  patent  rules  leave  a  lot  of  room  for  improvement,  and  the  concerns  about 
industry capture are not significant enough to give up on the hope of reform.   
Several prominent patent scholars have warned that unless Congress remains committed 
to maintaining the unitary patent laws, the system will quickly devolve into a legislative tool for 
                                                              
316 See id. at 1504 (“Domestic parties win 64% of cases tried to juries in which the adversary is foreign … . However, 
there is no significant difference in win rates for foreign and domestic parties when judges adjudicate.”).  
317 TRIPS is more likely to be a problem for patent reforms that attempt to avoid excessive patent grants that harm 
U.S. consumers but increase industry profits, although it still might be difficult to establish an injury outside of the 
pharmaceutical industry. In theory, any policy that diminishes the length or strength of patents in a field to avoid 
unnecessary  consumer  deadweight  loss  (as  opposed  to  facilitating  subsequent  innovation)  should  produce  an 
observable loss in trade exports by the affected foreign firms. However, those effects will be complicated in industries 
where innovative companies are just as likely to be sued for patent infringement as to enforce their own patents, 
which includes most industries other than pharmaceuticals. If Congress were to selectively shorten the patent term 
for drugs, pharmaceutical companies would be unambiguously injured, and there would be a clear loss of revenue to 
foreign firm pharmaceutical companies earning royalties from U.S. drug sales. See supra notes and text accompanying 
notes 209-219; cf. Decision by the Arbitrators, Canada — Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/R (Sept. 18, 2000) 
(ruling in favor of the EU in a case it brought against Canada for violating TRIPS by providing less that 20 years of 
patent protection to pharmaceuticals). It is probably not a coincidence that every WTO trade ruling on patent policy 
thus  far  has  involved  a  case  brought  on  behalf  of  the  pharmaceutical  industry. See  World Trade Organization 
(WTO), WTO Dispute Settlement: One-Page Case Summaries: 1995-2011, 24, 36, 47 & 69 (2012).   
318 See Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy Signals: Capturing Private Information for Public Benefit, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 36-37 
(2012). The pharmaceutical industry is an outlier in this regard. See infra note 323.   
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dispensing favors to special-interest groups, and will begin to look more like the tax code or 
certain aspects of copyright law.319 Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner argue that technology-specific 
laws are a slippery slope, and that special interest “shenanigans would be much worse in a world 
in  which  it  was  broadly  accepted  that  differential  patents  for  different  technologies  were 
appropriate.”320 Dan Burk and Mark Lemley contend that the unitary system shields patent law 
from distortionary rent seeking “because different industries have different interests, making it 
difficult for one interest group to push through changes to the statute.”321 Clarissa Long echoes 
these  concerns:  “patent  law’s  ‘uniformity  norm,’  which  mandates  that  patent  law  should  be 
technology-neutral,  has  been  especially  important  in  making  the  statute  more  impervious  to 
interest group pressures than the copyright statute, which heavily bears the marks of interest 
group influence.”322  
Although the skeptics of technology-specific patent laws are right to be wary of industry 
capture, certain aspects of the patent system make industry capture less of a concern here than in 
other contexts. Outside of the pharmaceutical industry, 323 most firms view patents as a double-
                                                              
319 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U.L. REV. 77, 
143 n.160 (2002); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 22, at 100; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at 204; Long, supra note 4, 
at 48.  
320 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at 205; id. at 198 (“[W]hile theoretical arguments can be made in favor of 
‘tuning’ the attributes of patent protection in different technologies, opening the door to such tuning is likely to 
quickly lead to special pleading that will not serve the public interest.”).  
321 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 22, at 100; see also Allison & Lemley, supra note 319, at 143 n.160 (“One of the real 
problems with such industry-specific tailoring is that it gives rise to enormous opportunities for rent seeking.”).  
322 Clarisa  Long,  Interest  Groups  in  Patent  and  Copyright,  SEQUENTIAL  ESSAYS  OF  THE  COLUMBIA  LAW  SCHOOL 
FACULTY 157-58 (2008). Copyright scholars have been very critical of the various industry-specific provisions in the 
copyright laws, and often argue that those provisions are largely the product of industry rent seeking. See Jessica D. 
Litman,  Copyright  Legislation  and  Technological  Change,  68  OR.  L.  REV.  275  (1989);  Timothy  Wu,  Copyright's 
Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2004). 
323 The FDA’s regulatory structure creates a sharp division between the pharmaceutical companies that benefit from 
patent protection on their drugs and the generic manufacturers harmed by that protection, which changes the 
political dynamic in the industry. Pharmaceutical companies will almost always want to lengthen and strengthen 
their patent protection as they apply to generic manufacturers, while generics want a shorter term than preferred by 
the  brand-name firms. Since the pharmaceutical  companies  have  more  resources  to  lobby,  this  dynamic  could 
distort the patent system in ways that favor the interests of pharmaceutical companies over the general public. On  
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edged sword. They use the patent system to gain a competitive advantage over rival firms, but 
their rivals can do the same to them, and the transaction costs in licensing can make it difficult 
for  firms  to  negotiate  mutually  beneficial  arrangements. 324  While  the  publishing  and 
entertainment industries continually (and successfully) push to lengthen the copyright term,325 
industry’s preferences for the patent term are much less one-sided.326 Relying on industry groups 
to lobby for the socially optimal patent length in their field may be naïve,327 but there are signs 
that many of those groups would lobby for – or at least accept – something closer to the socially 
optimal length than the current 20-year period.328  
Patent scholars sometimes argue that the uniform patent laws provide a bulwark against 
distortionary rent seeking by powerful industry groups.329 It is true that the patent system has 
proven  unusually  resistant  to  one-sided  capture  by  special-interest  groups,  but  nothing  has 
“blocked” legislators from doing to patent law what they have done to the tax code and copyright 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
the other hand, the government’s role as a provider (or subsidizer) of health insurance puts it in the position of 
paying for these drugs. To the extent that legislators would prefer to provide their constituents with the same level of 
prescription drug benefits while diverting money from those programs to other projects, they have an incentive to 
shorten the drug-patent term (or take other measures to reduce spending on patented drugs, such as pushing for 
lower prices). 
324 See supra notes 86-84.   
325 See supra note 322. When Congress first established the patent and copyright systems in 1790, they both had a 14-
year term. While the patent term has remained relatively stable, the copyright term has steadily increased, and now 
stands  at  life-of-the-author  plus  70  years.  See  Edward  C.  Walterscheid,  The Remarkable—and Irrational—Disparity 
Between the Patent Term and the Copyright Term, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 233, 233 (2001).  
326 See Mandel, supra note 318.  
327 Some scholars argue (or assume) that private industry will usually push for patent rights that are longer and 
stronger  the  socially  optimal  level  of  protection.  See, e.g.,  WILLIAM  M.  LANDES  &  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 15 (2004) (noting that “the public and private interests in 
effective regulation of the patent process may coincide” in some places, “[b]ut this is unlikely to be a general feature of 
intellectual property law, because of the persisting asymmetry with regard to the private benefits from recognizing 
versus denying intellectual property rights.”). Others suggest that industry groups will often want weaker patent 
rights relative to the social optimum because patents provide a vehicle for innovative start-ups to enter the field. See 
F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 747-48 (2001).  
328 Cf.  Matt  Richtel,  Chairman of Amazon Urges Reduction of Patent Terms,  NEW YORK TIMES,  Mar.  11,  2000,  C4 
(reporting that Jeff Bezos, the founder and CEO of Amazon.com, publicly advocates reducing the patent term for 
software and business-method patents to three to five years).   
329 See supra note 321.  
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law. The uniform patent laws do not stop Congress from passing technology-specific patent laws; 
they are the result of Congress not passing those laws. The rent-seeking objection to technology-
specific rules rests on the assumption that Congress is ideologically committed to treating all firms 
equally within the patent system, and that any technology-specific rule would undermine that 
legislative norm.330 Legislators’ willingness to tinker with the tax code and copyright laws, while 
leaving the patent system largely untouched for the past 200 years, suggests that something else is 
at  play  than  a  collective  commitment  against  using  complicated  statutes  to  provide  special-
interest favors. Whatever is causing the resistance to specialized patent legislation that would 
benefit particular firms or industry groups at the public’s expense, the predominantly uniform 
patent laws could be a product or side effect of that resistance, but not the explanation for it.  
There are a few technology-specific patent laws that are already on the books, and none 
seem to reflect the rent-seeking problems that scholars fear. There are rules against patents on 
tax  strategies331 and  human  organisms;332 a  bar  on  enforcing  surgical-method  patents  against 
medical  providers; 333 and  a  (recently  expanded)  prior-user  defense  in  infringement  cases 
involving business-method patents.334 None of these laws were industry handouts, and they have 
                                                              
330 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at 204 (“By and large, the presumption today is that everyone gets the same 
patent treatment. Without this presumption, there would be tremendous pressure by industries to get features in 
‘their’ patents that they found desirable. Of course, the arguments for these preferences would always be couched in 
public interest terms, but when an industry lobbyist starts talking about the public interest, we all know it is a good 
time to keep an eye on the consumer’s wallet.”); Long, supra note 322, at 157-58. 
331 See America Invents Act of 2011, Sept. 16, 2011, Public Law 112-29, sec. 14, 125 Stat. 284. (2011).  
332 See America Invents Act of 2011, sec. 33(a). This provision in the America Invents Act codified a prior legislative 
directive and PTO policy that prohibited the patenting of human organisms. See Robert W. Bahr, PTO Memorandum, 
Claims  Directed  to  or  Encompassing  a  Human  Organism,  Sept.  20,  2011,  at 
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/human-organism-memo.pdf.  
333 35 U.S.C. § 287. This provision was strongly supported by the American Medical Association, and opposed by 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 51, 102 n.269 (2010),  
334 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) (added Nov. 29, 1999, Public Law 106-113, sec. 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501A-555 (S. 1948 
sec. 4302). Congress amended this provision in 2011 to remove the business-method limitation.  See America Invents 
Act of 2011, sec. 5.   
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not led to a flood of subsequent industry lobbying for firm-specific patent extensions or other 
rent-seeking distortions.335  
The  drug-specific  patent  provisions  in  the  Hatch-Waxman  Act  of  1984  provide  a 
compelling  counterexample  to  the  claim  that  technology-specific  patent  laws  will  inevitably 
benefit private industry at the public’s expense. Hatch-Waxman established a regulatory pathway 
for generic drugs to enter the market without extensive clinical trials.336 To facilitate generic 
entry without shortening the effective patent life of new drugs (i.e., time from market launch to 
generic entry), Congress had to implement several counterbalancing drug-specific patent rules.337 
It provided generic manufacturers with an experimental-use defense so they could enter the 
market faster,338 and created a bounty system to encourage challenges to drug patents.339 It then 
provided patent-term extensions to drug companies to compensate them for lost patent life,340 
and created an automatic 30-month stay on generic entry while courts resolve patent disputes.341 
Although  the  litigation  between  generics  and  drug  companies  has  been  problematic,342 most 
                                                              
335 Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner cite two instances of drug-company lobbying as evidence that “Congress opened the 
door for such gaming when it passed the Hatch-Waxman Act.” JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at 204-05. They first 
point to a multi-million dollar lobbying effort by Schering-Plough to receive a three-year extension on the patent for 
Claritin™, id. at 205, even though that effort failed and the drug went generic on schedule. See Gardiner Harris, As 
Blockbuster Claritin Goes Generic, Schering-Plough Pushes a Close Sibling,  WALL.  ST.  J.,  Mar.  22,  2002.    Their  second 
example is a 2002 law that shielded Eli Lilly from product liability suits over one of their vaccines, but this provision 
is unrelated to the Hatch-Waxman Act and patent system. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 25, at 205.  
336 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman Act”), Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §355 (1994)).  
337 See F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
167, 197-98 (2009) (recounting the legislative history and compromises leading to the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
338 35 U.S.C. § 271(e).  
339 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
340 35 U.S.C. § 156.  
341 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
342 See Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 211, at 948 (discussing some of the questionable strategies that pharmaceutical 
companies sometimes use to delay generic entry beyond the point at which their primary drug patents have expired); 
Roin, supra note 22, at (discussing how pharmaceutical companies screen many potentially valuable drugs out of 
their pipeline because their patents would be too weak to survive a challenge by generic manufacturers).   
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commentators view the pairing of these rules as fair,343 and the statute overall is widely seen as a 
success story.344 The average effective patent life for new drugs has held steady at roughly 11 to 
12 years.345 Meanwhile, the market share for generic drugs has gradually increased from 19% of 
prescriptions filled in 1984 to 78% in 2011, and is expected to keep growing – saving the U.S. 
health care system over $1 trillion by one estimate.346 Skeptics of technology-specific patent laws 
still  suggest  that  Hatch-Waxman  illustrates  the  dangers  of  breaking  with  the  uniform  patent 
scheme,347 but the examples given tend to focus on the smaller issues, such as unseemly litigation 
tactics  sometimes  used  in  drug-patent  litigation.348 No  one  argues  that  Hatch-Waxman  is 
perfect.349 The question is whether it benefited the public relative to the uniform patent laws, or 
                                                              
343 See Duffy, supra note 54, at 507 & n.194; Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing 
Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 182-83 (2001); Scherer, supra 
note 337, at 198.  
344 See Richard G. Frank, The Ongoing Regulation of Generic Drugs, 357 N. ENG. J. MED. 1993, 1993 (2007) (noting that 
Hatch-Waxman “is widely viewed as a health policy success story”). Indeed, the Hatch-Waxman Act usually receives 
its strongest praise from the commentators who tend to be highly critical of the pharmaceutical industry. See, e.g., 
Alfred B. Engelberg et al., Balancing Innovation, Access, and Profits – Market Exclusivity for Biologics, 361 N. ENG. J. MED. 
1917 (2009) (“[T]he Waxman-Hatch Act successfully balanced the public interest in providing adequate incentives 
for investment in innovation with the public interest in providing affordable medications.”). 
345 See Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 210, at 6 fg. 4; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 210. Estimating the average 
market exclusivity period for drugs prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act is difficult because generic drugs as we known 
them did not exist. Since there were no patent-term extensions to compensate firms for the patent life lost during 
clinical trials, their average effective patent life was roughly 9 years, but generics could not enter the market without 
completing their own round of clinical trials, and they could not begin testing until the drug patent expired. See 
Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 103-04 
(2000).  
346 See UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), DRUG PRICING: RESEARCH ON SAVINGS 
FROM GENERIC DRUG USE, 2 & 4, GAO-12-371R (2012).  
347 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 22, at 100; Long, supra note 322, at 157 (“Although the patent community 
certainly doesn’t lack for interest groups, they’ve made little headway in grabbing goodies for themselves, with only 
one significant exception—the Hatch-Waxman Act.”); supra note 335 (discussing Jaffe and Lerner’s contention that 
“Congress opened the door for such gaming when it passed the Hatch-Waxman Act”).  
348 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 22, at 100 (“Nor should it be surprising that these industry-specific statutes have 
had some pernicious consequences—for example, the pharmaceutical-specific Hatch-Waxman provisions have been 
gamed on numerous occasions as pharmaceutical patent owners have manipulated the stay provisions or colluded 
with putative generic entrants to prevent entry into the market.”). 
349 See, e.g., Frank, supra note 344, at 1995-96.   
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instead benefited private industry at the public’s expense, as the political-economy critique of 
technology-specific rules would predict. Hatch-Waxman is clearly an example of the former.350  
Political economy concerns are always difficult to resolve, especially when framed around 
unspecified policy reforms. In this particular context, however, those concerns are not significant 
enough to reject proposals for tailoring patent awards based on objective criteria that are strongly 
correlated with the socially optimal reward.   
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The primary justification for the uniform patent laws and fixed 20-year patent term is 
that the government does not have a reliable framework for determining which inventions should 
receive more protection than others. This paper provides that framework by showing that the 
optimal patent length for inventions is closely related to their time-to-market – an observable 
characteristic.  The  current  policy  of  providing  the  same  statutory  term  of  protection  and 
applying the same patent rules to all inventions, regardless of the amount of time it takes to 
develop them, visibly and predictably deviates from the optimum. The government should use 
differences in the average time-to-market for inventions as the foundation for a system of tailored 
patent awards.  
 
 
                                                              
350 Congress passed a law similar to Hatch-Waxman in 2010 to allow “follow-on” competition in the market for 
biologic drugs. See Title VII, Subtitle A, §§ 7001–7003, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 
(BPCIA),  of  The  Patient  Protection  and  Affordable  Care  Act,  Public  Law  111-148,  124  Stat.  118,  804  (111th 
Congress) (2010). The effects of this law are not yet known, but the legislative history makes clear that the major 
stakeholders vetted all of the bill’s regulatory and patent provisions, and that the final legislation was a compromise 
between  competing  interests.  See  Krista  Hessler  Carver  et  al.,  An  Unofficial  Legislative  History  of  the  Biologics  Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 671 (2010).  